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41. INTRODUCTION
The current trend in the industrial development is towards large,
centralized production units and there is, consequently, an increasing
potential for severe accidents. This in turn creates an increasing
demand on methods for systematic risk analysis and - in case of
release of the accident potential - means for effective emergency
management. At the same time, there is a dramatic development
within electronic information technology and, quite naturally,
widespread efforts to exploit this technology in the design of systems
for support of systematic risk analysis, decision support systems for
operating crews during plant disturbances and accident control, and
for support of the general emergency management organization. The
topic of the present report is a feasibility study aiming at identification
of the key problems in non-nuclear industrial emergency management
for which the use of modern information technology at present
appears to offer solutions, and to point to the lines of necessary
development. The study will be divided into a number of sections,
each having a specific focus:
First, a selective review has been made of the state of the art of
decision support systems and "expert systems" with the aim of
selecting a conceptual framework for the subsequent analysis and of
identifying tools for promising system design approaches. From this
review it appears that the present development of models of decision
support systems based on the system theoretic point of view and the
concurrent swing towards more cognitively oriented task analysis offer
a suitable framework. Furthermore, AI-tools for data base design and
for communication for distributed decision making should be
considered carefully for a more detailed  development.
An analysis of the specific problem domain of emergency
management in more detail supports the proposal for use of a
cognitive task analysis framework. In particular, the framework seems
to be a very suitable tool for identifying the relationships between
information sources, information users, as well as the content of the
information needed in decision situations during emergency
management. In addition, it will be effective for specification of the
information formats to be used in risk analysis reports, inspection
reports, and data bases of the various relevant services and
authorities, in order to make the information accessible during
emergency situations.
Finally, reports from a number of recent Danish industrial
accidents have been reviewed, and key persons interviewed, to give a
5preliminary basis for judging the feasibility of the theoretic discussion.
In order to give a background for the use of Danish case stories, the
organization of emergency management in Denmark is briefly
described.
The result has been that there is a potential for development of a
distributed data base for support of emergency management, if the
information need of the actual task forces is studied carefully, and the
proper formats of information and suitable retrieval attributes are
derived from such studies. Tools for such studies are now available.
In addition, the administration of the data bases of a number of
services and authorities will have to be studied, and means for
coordination developed.
The report ends with a number of recommendations to this effect.
2.REVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE ART OF DECISION SUPPORT
SYSTEMS
The purpose of this review is a identification of the various lines of
development of advanced information systems which are intended for
support of distributed decision making, and for data base querying
and consulting systems.
Design of advanced information systems is an activity in the
intersection of the active interest of several professions such as
management science, economics and organizational science,
computer systems engineering, information and software science,
operations research, etc., together with the professions of the different
application domains. The approaches taken to the application of
advanced information technology have consequently been from
different points of view, and the emphasis has been different. What is
taken for granted in one program of development, turns out to be a
research issue in other programs. Therefore, to have a guide for a
review of the vast literature, an overview of the characteristics of the
different lines of approach will be useful.
2.1 Management Information and Decision Support Systems
Support of administrative and managerial activities in institutions
and commercial organizations is the classical domain for development
of information processing systems. In such organizations, a group of
decision makers with different roles are interacting with and sharing a
common problem domain, for which the state of affairs is represented
in the data base of an information system. Several approaches have
been made towards the introduction of decision support functions in
this information system.
6Until recently, the behaviouristic research paradigm has been in
control of psychological and social studies and, consequently, the
explicit study of the cognitive processes involved in decision making
tasks has not been considered an acceptable approach. Development
of managerial decision support systems has, therefore, been pursued
separately in two schools, one based on a management science
perspective, focusing on the formulation of rational, normative
decision making strategies based on objective economic analysis of
the problem domain, another based on a social science perspective
and focusing on the social system considering the roles and needs of
the people in the system. The two approaches considering what are
generally labelled "management information systems" and "decision
support systems", respectively, have been considered alternative
paths to a solution, an attitude which has caused considerable
controversy. However, due to increasing understanding of the
cognitive aspects of decision making, a more integrated view of the
system has recently been evolving. These lines of development will be
briefly reviewed.
Management science approach. A major class of proposals for
decision support systems has been based on decision making
research rooted in economic theories, in particular the expected utility
theory developed by economists and mathematicians. The approach
focuses on decision making from a prescriptive point of view only. It is
a logical structure for decisions and makes no claim that it represents
or describes the information processing of human decision makers.
The emphasis is not on what they do, but on what they should do.
Modern theorists (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) emphasize the
mathematical modelling of subjective probability and utility and
promote the use of the theory to aid decision makers to achieve logical
consistency. Management scientists typically base their system design
on the assumption that managers will be able to, and want to, apply
formal, optimal decision strategies derived from economic theories, if
supported by suitable information systems based on such theories.
This means that decision makers should alter their practice when
supported by the system. A general criticism of this approach has
been that the formal models based on economic or decision theories
fail to appreciate the complexity of the challenges under which real-
world decision makers must operate. Critics of decision theory also
argue that it is not useful as a guide because human beings do not
behave in accordance with the fundamental assumptions of the
theory.
7In fact, management information systems based on such models
have not been particularly successful for a number of reasons, such
as:
• Higher level executives do not follow the normative decision models
(Mintzberg, 1973, Dreyfuss et al., 1980).
•  They do not take into account the intentional nature of the
systems to be controlled (Rasmussen).
•  They do not consider that needs and tools vary considerably with
the role of the decision maker and his position in an organisation
(Sutherland, 1983).
This does not, however, exclude the usefulness of the rational,
normative decision models when implemented in consistent computer
programs. Only well defined analysis tasks should, however, be
allocated computers, and only in support of human users who can
evaluate the necessary preconditions and data. The critique of the use
of decision theoretic models for decision support systems is valid only
for situations when the system forces a user to use normative
procedures against his actual needs.
Social science approach. Whereas the management science
approach is focused on the problem characteristics, the perspective of
the social science is primarily concerned with the characteristics of
the decision makers and their social roles. Contrary to a normative
view of decision making, the aim is to match the support system to
the immediate preferences of the decision maker in terms of cognitive
style, personality, etc.(For a detailed review, see Sage, 1981).
Therefore, social scientists take the stand that decision support
should be based on an analysis of the decision strategies preferred by
the individual decision maker in a specific organisation, and designed
in cooperation with the user. This means that there will be no formal
basis for evaluating the performance of such a system; the only basis
for judgement will be user-acceptance, and there will be no structured
way to plan the functional systems design, which will be based on
bottom-up integration of the requirements of the individual activities.
System science approach. Recently, a more integrated, top-down
approach to the design of management decision support systems has
been taken by system scientists. An illustrative example is the
discussion presented by Sutherland (1983). He compares the
approaches taken by the two schools based upon management
science and social science, respectively. His conclusion is that both
approaches are too schematic and drawn to unacceptable extremes,
and that a more balanced view should be taken.
A formal system theoretic approach to design of decision support
systems is necessary; but, on the other hand, it is necessary to take
8into consideration that decision making in the different levels of an
organization cannot be covered by one theoretical model, and will
require different tools for effective support.
This means that formal models are needed for the functional
organization of support systems, at the same time as it is realized that
behavioural, cognitive, and sociotechnical factors are indeed critical
determinants of managerial practice:
First, the system designer must "assess client properties against
some sort of normative referent", i.e., it is necessary to define the role
of the client company in the overall economic environment, to define
the function at the level of purpose. Next, it is argued that rather than
to consider the decision makers in terms of personality types (such as
risk takers versus risk averters; theory X versus theory Y), it is
necessary to apply some sort of taxonomy of decision functions to
map decision technologies onto decision types.
Four levels of decision types are identified and correlated with
decision processes and support models:
• Goal programming and long range planning at the highest level are
related to sequential state model for heuristic problem solving
procedures or structured decision making procedures. Support in
this function is essential for executives who are responsible for
development of the firm over the long run. At this level,
development of a plan serves to define the trajectory an
organization will be expected to take from some current position to
an assumedly more favourable position in the future.
• Strategic analysis at the next lower level includes contingency
planning related to stochastic-state techniques to provide for
deductive techniques for problems the "state" outcomes of which
are variable, such as game-theoretic models or logical analysis
programs. This technique underlies most classic military
contingency planning.
• The tactical programming, one level further down includes
"equilibrium maintenance" mainly based on statistics-based
decision and control instruments for dealing with probabilistic
problems, such as econometric methods, parametric decision
theory, etc. Instruments of this form dominate at the tactical level
of most organizations, where the ambition is to try to keep the
parameters of the organization in some sort of equilibrium position
with the near term properties of the immediate operating
environment by means of functions such as forecasting, logistical
programming, budgeting, and financial control.
• The lowest level is concerned with operations management, based
on discrete-state instruments which are primarily algorithmic and
9analytical methods that allow optimal solutions of deterministic
problems. This is the domain of methods of industrial engineering
and operations research.
The basic idea of this system theoretic approach is that any properly
conceived management support system should include tools for all of
these levels. And, this is so, whether or not it is requested by the
existing management authorities.
Sutherland emphasizises the need for a structured design
methodology:
1. The first step is to identify "a population of decision requirements
that is derived by examining organizations in aggregate in terms of
universalistic (e.g., ideal-type or categorial) as well as context
specific properties." The "population of decision problems can be
abstracted from the particular organizational units or personalities
without loss of technical integrity. This abstraction is indeed
necessary, for macrosystem requirements should not be induced
from a consideration of requirements associated with existing
agencies or individuals."  The "most essential implication of the
abstraction of decision requirements from organizational agencies is
that it allows the designer to carry through the mapping function to
a different level of effect through formal decomposition analysis
(compare the identification of control requirements in the cognitive
task analysis discussed in next section).
2. The next step is an attempt to reduce a population of functionally
abstracted decision requirements to their most fundamental
constituents, i.e., to decompose into elementary operations or
primitives.
3. Then, the set of all primitives is reduced into a prime set, in order
to remove redundancies.
4. Given this prime set, attention shifts to the instrumental
capabilities they imply in terms of a collection of decision aids. All
integral decision aids or model base components are now
decomposed into their lowest order transformational components -
the microfunctions which are the basic elements of "any structured
model-base".
5. Now a prime set of system facilities is generated, to have a
mutually exclusive set which in aggregate should be able to perform
all the functions associated with the set of decision aids from which
they were derived.
6. Any of the higher-order decision requirements should thus be able
to be met by synthesizing in effective real-time the functions
pertinent to the integral decision aid.
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Sutherland then discusses how modern information technology
should be used to improve the quality of managerial practice. He
argues that next generation support systems will tend to have the
following provisions:
1. In those areas where technical default by humans has serious
consequences, the authority of the support system will expand.
2. In areas where managerial issues are complex, well-articulated
and consistently enforced check and balance procedures may be
introduced via system facilities, i.e., an authority shift in balance
between decision makers and decision analysts. (Note:  an error
recovery feature.)
3. The support systems will constrain the analytical and technical
prerogatives of decision authorities along lines consistent with
scientifically preferred decision methodology.
The prerequisite for this concept will be that the analytical procedures
or techniques underlying a support system are congruent with the
nature of the problem at hand. Therefore, the tools for the different
levels in an organisation will be different. This congruence is
discussed with reference to generic problem/instrument domain. Four
levels of problems are considered: Deterministic, probabilistic,
equifinal, and indeterminate problems. Also four instrument
categories are used: Discrete state (operations research, industrial
engineering, or AI algorithms), finite state (statistical decision theory,
correlation, regression), stochastic state (contingency planning), and
sequential state. Optimal tools are then to be found in the diagonal of
the representation, while choice outside the diagonal will be either
ineffective (insufficient) or inefficient (too sophisticated) for the
purpose.
The rationale for this solution will be to ensure that organisational
decision problems get all the precision and discipline they deserve,
but no more.
The social decision support approach is met by Sutherland with the
argument that "differences in decision "styles" are the reason why
normative decision constraints are required in the first place, not a
rationale for their neglect".
The approach to design of decision support systems proposed by
Sutherland is nearly congruent with that developed for support of
supervisory process plant control (Rasmussen, 1983, 1985) and
reflects the use of cognitive concepts to bridge between characteristics
of the problem space and the decision maker. In the present context,
it is important to note the application for distributed decision-making
in a social system.
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2.2 Expert Systems, Artificial Intelligence Approaches
While the approaches to decision support systems mentioned above
are predominantly problem driven, the solutions based on artificial
intelligence approaches are by nature tool driven.
Expert Systems. The presently most visible category of advanced
information systems is "expert systems". In particular following the
Japanese "fifth generation computer" initiatives, the term seems to
include all kinds of advanced information systems. In the present
context, however, the term "expert system" is used in the "classical"
sense to characterize a decision support systems based on heuristic
rules derived from experts and intended to support a well defined
decision maker having a uniform set of decision tasks within a
bounded information context. The problem context has typically been
chosen by AI research teams because they have formed "micro-
worlds" being suitable for program development. The general idea has
been to represent not the formal, "scientific" knowledge of professional
textbooks (typically being structural knowledge related to laws of
nature and "first principles"), but the know-how, and  heuristic rules-
of-thumb of highly skilled practitioners.
Recent reviews of the historical development of expert systems
(Hayes-Roth et al., 1983) focus on expert systems for application in
domains of very uniform characteristics, such as
• Dendral, for analysing mass spectroscopic, nuclear magnetic
resonance, and other such data to infer molecular structures,
• Mycin, for medical diagnosis of infectious blood desease,
• Expert, Cadeus, for other domains of medical diagnosis,
• Prospector for geologic survey support, etc.
The present expert systems are laboratory "demonstration"
systems, of which non are in actual, serious use. Several problems are
to be expected from serious application of this approach to decision
support systems:
• In order to be accepted by a user, advice from an expert system in a
risky decision context will require a more elaborate explanation
capability than is presently available (see, for instance, Rasmussen
and Goodstein, 1985).
• The lack of well defined limits of the domain of expertise and the
lack of ability to retract to arguments based on first principles. This
problem is formulated in the following way by Hayes-Roth et al.,
1983): "Today's expert systems typically show up badly when
measured along a number of dimensions:
- They are unable to recognize or deal with problems for which
their own knowledge is inapplicable or insufficient.
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- They have no independent means of checking whether their
conclusions are reasonable.
- Explication of their reasoning process is frequently silent on
fundamental issues.
In a review Buchanan (1982) concluded with the following limitations:
• Narrow domain of expertise,
• Limited language for expressing facts and relations, limited
assumptions about problem and solution methods,
• Stilized explanations of lines of reasoning,
• Little knowledge of their own scope and limitations,
• Knowledge bases extensible but little help available for initial design
decisions,
• Single expert as "knowledge czar".
In a discussion of control problems in expert systems, Barnett
(1982) was concerned with the reliability of such systems. The
symptom-based rules are derived from experts' experience rather than
being model-based. Therefore, they are usually very effective and
produce correct behaviour, but they also have the potential to
produce inconsistent responses to unfamiliar information. "The rules
are plausible and work a high percentage of the time, this is why
experts use them. However, when they fail, the human expert will
know enough to realize this fact and find out why. He retreats to a
better grounded model (one based on more general principles.
These problem may not be prohibitive for the application in the
domain where the classic expert systems are developed, because of
the recurrent and uniform nature of the problems and the well
structured set of action alternatives. In general these features are not
typical for the decision situations for which data base or support
systems are developed.
There is, however, some signs of activities to resolve the problem.
Lehner et al. (1985) explore the relationship between AI and decision
analysis. Decision analysis is found to be based on normative, or
prescriptive, problem representations intended to guide users through
an effective decision process. They continue: "Unfortunately, from the
perspective of many types of practical decision-aiding applications,
both normative decision aids and expert system technology have
significant limitations. Particularly, in expert system development
there is a lack of established techniques for problem structuring and
knowledge engineering. This has led to time-consuming rule-based
development efforts with limited success in domains where the
knowledge required to solve problems is not already well
documented." On this basis the paper considers the combination of
13
production systems and multi-attribute utility models; in a way, it
proposes expert system support in operation on a model, i.e., support
in operation at the knowledge-based level. The argument for this
development supports the need for problem structuring in the present
context of emergency management.
From this review, use of "expert-systems" for support of the
decision making process "on-line" seems to be premature. However, AI
tools for organization of the distributed data base available to
emergency management may be feasible.
Other Artificial Intelligence Approaches. More differentiated
approaches have been taken to the design of decision support
systems, when AI techniques have been considered tools in a design
effort based on analysis of the problem requirements.
A system oriented approach to design of a system for support of
distributed  decision making, based on the tools made available by
artificial intelligence research has been proposed by Thorndyke et al.
(1982). This proposal will be reviewed in some detail because
distributed problem solving appears to be an important feature of
emergency management:
Thorndyke et al. describe a system for model-based situation
assessment and planning based on expert system architecture.
Applications are described for military strategic planning, air traffic
control, location and identification of hazardous chemical spills. To
model the organization of time stressed situation analysis and
planning, the "cooperating experts paradigm" is used.
Distributed problem solving is becoming increasingly important for
the planning of support systems for a variety of domains such as
battlefield decision making, air traffic control, etc., characterised by
widely dispersed data gathering, time stressed decision making, and
natural clustering of activities. Distributed problem solving uses
separate processors to attack the problem at multiple points,
exploiting parallelism for speed and power. Distribution frequently
entails the decomposition into a set of loosely coupled subproblems.
A detailed description of the approach as used for air traffic control
can be found in Stebb et al. (1981), who examine the use of heuristic
methods for coordinating the cooperation among several decision
makers having a common set of objectives. Focus is on development
of system architecture for distributed situation assessment, planning,
and control. Different experts share a common data base - the world
model. The experts either sense the world and infer aircraft
intentions, generate and evaluate plans, control and monitor
execution, or communicate mutually.
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Distribution of functions may be chosen in a variety of ways leading
to different architectures:
• Space centered, based on geography.
• Function centered, based on aircraft function.
• Plan centered, based on planning approach.
• Hierarchical, based on level of abstraction.
• Object centered, based on autonomous self-planning.
• Object centered, based on communicating objects.
Goals to consider for air traffic control are the following:
• Error free routing, no collisions with obstacles or other   planes.
• Uncertainty reduction, adapt to changing conditions   (weather,
etc.).
• Adherence to separation regulations.
• Resource (fuel) conservation.
Problem solving processes considered for air traffic control are:
1. Situation assessment.
2. Conflict recognition.
3. Plan generation.
4. Plan evaluation.
5. Message passing.
6. Bargaining.
7. Plan execution.
For the organisation of these activities the Hearsay-II paradigm is
used (Erman et al., 1980). A number of experts are organised around
a common data base, the "world model": a sensor, a plan generator,
an evaluator, a communicator, and a controller.
They cooperate in the function mentioned:
Situation assessment  involves updating of the world model by the
sensor or the communicator. The evaluator takes care of  conflict
recognition , by trajectory projection, or by including planned
manoeuvres received via communicator in projection. Plan generation
depends on coordinated planning in all processors sharing the same
airspace. Four types of coordination are considered: preplanned
protocols, iterative local planning, asynchronous cooperative
planning, and simultaneous global planning.
With preplanned protocols, each processor acts according to
predefined rules, known to all processors. Assuming each processor
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maintains accurate knowledge of the planning methods and
protocols of the other processors communications are largely
unnecessary. However, such rigid individual behaviour may lead to
suboptimal global solutions.
In iterative local planning, all processors sharing a local region
initially exchange goals and constraints. Such coordination may
require time synchronisation of the planning activities. Each
processor then generates plans only for aircraft under its control
and communicates intentions to the other processors, who will then
replan. Deadlocks and loops may occur.
In asynchronous cooperative planning, nearby processors also share
goals and intentions, but, in addition, they share partial plans so
that discrepancies are identified and acted upon quickly. Rather
than iterating individually, the processors act as a committee,
revising plans until an overall solution is found. This approach
characterises Opplan, Hearsay-II, HASP, and has been successfully
used in distributed applications (Lessser and Erman, 1980).
In simultaneous global planning, processors initially exchange their
status and goals, then each autonomously works towards a single
overall plan. Different plans are then generated, representing the
different perspectives of the participants, and the ultimate plan is
chosen through bargaining.
Plan evaluation depends on simulation of the execution of the
candidate plan. It determines whether plans meet certain minimum
standards and selects the best of the qualified. If none passes,
reasons for the failures are posted.
Message passing is then initiated by communicator, requesting
processors to amend their plans. The communicator is administrating
the communication channels, based on an information value model,
considering the needs and costs of transmission.
Bargaining may impose heavy communication requirements, and
an arbitor may be assignsd, who willl use some social "welfare
function" to resolve conflicts.
Plan execution involves the control of the plan and monitoring by
the controller.
Architectures of organisation. Six distinct organisations are
proposed:
Three distinct distribution methods, depending on association of
processors with:
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1) The objects they control and the data they gather. Two types,
depending on on-board processors which are either autonomouos
(a communication-free organisation in which each aircraft performs
all control functions autonomously) or cooperative (aircrafts
communicate to plan collectively by resolving conflicts. Both
iterative local planning and asynchronuous planning can be
supported).
2) Clusters suggested by the planning environment. Two types,
depending on either regional grouping (each processor controls a
region rather than an aircraft) or functional grouping (each
processor controls a particular phase of a flight, or a particular type
of crafts)
3) Subproblems defined by decomposition. Two types depending on
either global solutions from different perspectives and bargaining or
hierarchical decomposition (i.e., decomposition of the problem or of
the problem solving system?).
The conclusion of this review is that the structure offered by the
HEARSAY system concept for communication and coordination in a
distributed group of decision makers appears to match the needs for
data base support in emergency management, and should be
considered in more detail for future developments.
2.3 Decision Support in Emergency Management
The present problem of information systems for emergency
management in appears to be characteristic in the following respects:
• The problem domain is poorly defined. The system should support
decision making related to a large variety of emergencies, caused by
very different physical processes. The resources to consider in
emergency control may belong to different technical service fields.
• The decision maker(s) are difficult to identify in advance, being
dependent on the size and nature of the actual case.
• Several organisations and technical services may be involved, and
decision making will have the nature of a cooperative effort in a
distributed system.
• Support from the system may be relevant during dynamic
emergency situations, as well as for planning purposes.
• The information needed for decisions may stem from a large variety
of sources, such as engineering textbooks, laws and regulations,
risk analysis, analysis of prior accidents, procedures, and
instructions.
Key problems for system development will, therefore, be to consider:
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• Organisation of large, inhomogenous data bases, information
retrieval, requirements for analysis supplying data in order to have
proper data attributes and formats compatible with user needs.
• Analysis of the organisation of the cooperative decision making, and
the structure of the communication network involved.
• The nature, in general terms (covering typical situation scenarios),
of the control and decision task, and the related information needs.
At present it appears very plausible that a coordinated data base and
a consistent specification of the information needs of the various
decision makers, as well as of the requirement to the information
formats used by the information sources, will be an important area of
development for advanced information technology.
4. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS AND DESIGN OF DECISION
SUPPORT SYSTEMS
In consequence of the discussion in the previous section, the
approach to the design of a decision support system based on new
technology should be taken from a cognitive point of view, and should
include an analysis of the decision task and the information
processing requirements in terms referring to human cognitive
functions.
In general, when designing systems for support of decision making,
the problem is to design systems which are also effective during
situations which have not been foreseen during design, and which are
not familiar to the user. In addition, such systems will be operated by
a wide variety of users whose background and formulation of needs
are poorly known. In such cases, the design cannot be based on a
detailed quantitative model of the actual information process; instead
a model or conceptual framework must be used which describes the
interaction in terms of related categories defining the boundaries of a
design envelope within which users can generate effective ad hoc
tactics suiting their subjective preferences.
For design it is necessary to structure the great variety of real life
work conditions into domains which correspond to design decisions.
By the use of a multi-facetted description system it is possible to
represent a great variety of conditions by a rather low number of
categories in each domain, related to general features. From this point
of view, the following dimensions of a conceptual framework for
description of a cognitive task have proved useful for the analysis of
cognitive tasks, and, hence, for design of decision support systems:
The problem domain. The first domain of an analysis which will
serve to bridge the gap between the purely technical description of the
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work content and the psychological analysis of user resources should
represent the functional properties of the system in a way which
makes it possible to identify the control requirements of the system
underlying the supervisory task. This is an analysis in technical
systems terms and will result in a systematic and consistent
representation of the problem space.
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Purpose-Based Properties 
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Figure 1. A means-ends abstraction hierarchy used for representation of the
functional properties of a physical work environment.
Since decision making in emergency management, as in many other
contexts, is a resource management problem, an appropriate
representation of the problem space should reflect the varying span of
attention in the part/whole dimension, and the varying level of
abstraction in the means/end dimension (see figure 1). Change in
representation along both dimensions is normally used by decision
makers in order to cope with the complexity of a decision task
(Rasmussen, 1985).
The decision sequence. The next domain of analysis to consider is
related to the decision process which has to be applied for operation
upon the problem space. It is generally accepted that the decision
process can be structured into a fairly small number of typical
decision processes representing the various phases of problem
analysis and diagnosis, evaluation and choice of goal priority,
planning of resources, and, finally, execution and monitoring, see
figure 2.
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GOAL
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Observation, 
Scanning for Cues 
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of Task
Planning of 
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Activation  
of Attention
Execution  
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PROCE- 
DURE
TARGETSTATE
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FOCUS
ALERT
Predict Consequences 
in Terms of Goals and 
Constraints
OPTIONS
Evaluate Options, 
Chose Relevant Goal
 
GOALS, 
CONS- 
STRAINTS
Heuristics,
Short-Cuts
Situation Analysis 
 
Diagnosis
Planning
Figure 2. Schematic map of the information processes involved in a control decision.
Rational, causal reasoning connects "states of knowledge" in the basic sequence.
Stereotyped processes based on "know-how" can bypass intermediate stages.
Human mental economy can be achieved by the partitioning of a
complex process in subroutines connected by more or less
standardised key nodes representing states of knowledge useful for
linking different processes, for bringing previously successful
subroutines into use in new situations, and for communicating with
cooperators in decision making. This is important since a decision
task will be shared by the ultimate decision maker and the operations
planner with the decision support system as the means of
communication.
The decision task analysis will have to consider whether the
decision is to be based on the planner's  or the system designer's
analysis a priori, and communicated to the ultimate actor by means of
operational instructions and/or computer programs (in order to
ensure proper treatment of, for instance, rare event risk
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considerations), or whether the decision must be left for an "on-line"
evaluation by the ultimate emergency manager.
At this level the task analysis will be in implementation-
independent terms, and will include identification of the cognitive
control mechanism required; i.e. which of the subroutines that can be
preplanned routines called from memory, and which must be
organised ad hoc.
Mental strategies and heuristics. An analysis in this problem
domain can serve to identify the information processing strategies
which are effective for the different phases of the decision sequence in
order to identify the required data, control structures, and processing
capacities. It is generally found that a given cognitive task can be
solved by several different strategies varying widely in their
requirements as to the kind of mental model and the type or amount
of observations required (see, for instance, for concept formation:
Bruner et al., 1956; for trouble shooting: Rasmussen et al., 1974; and
for bibliographic search: Pejtersen, 1979). An analysis of the task is
therefore important in order to identify the different strategies which
may be used to serve the different phases of the decision sequence,
and to select those which are considered effective and reliable.
This analysis, which is related to operations research rather than
psychology, identifies the information processes required in
implementation-independent terms as a basis for a subsequent
human-computer task allocation based on demand/resource
matching. It may be difficult to identify the useful, possible strategies
by rational analysis, but since users are very inventive regarding
identifying clever tricks, the strategies may be identified by empirical
studies of user behaviour. This, of course, requires psychological as
well as domain expertise.
An important part of the analysis is  identification of the general
resource requirements of the strategies in terms of data about the
actual system state, about basic functional relations, the processing
capacity needed, etc., and about the consequences of errors. The
results will be the basis for matching these requirements with the
resource characteristics of the designer, the support computer, and
the final user for planning of their roles in the interactive decision
task.
In highly structured, but complex decision tasks as, for instance,
involved in supervisory process control, the analysis of mental
processing strategies by techniques such as verbal protocols, can be
very important as a basis for identification of information needs
during rare situations and thus to select display formats. In the
present application of emergency management it will be very doubtful
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whether a systematic analysis of mental information processing
strategies is possible or even particularly helpful. The decision
situation will be rather unstructured and change from one situation
to the next. However, the type of situation met will be rather uniform
and frequent for an emergency task force, and the information needs
and formats may be identified by analysing the actors' roles in the
game, and from interviews and posterior analysis of cases, as has
been done for information retrieval studies in public libraries.
Cognitive control domain. While the information content should be
included in the messages from a decision support system from an
analysis of problem space and mental strategies, the form of the
displays should be selected from consideration of human cognitive
control mechanisms. This is necessary in order to have a
communication format which will lead future users to develop
effective mental models and heuristic rules. The familiarity with a
situation will determine the domain of cognitive control and, thereby,
the nature of the information used to control the activity and the
interpretation of observed information. Control may depend on a
repertoire of automated behavioural patterns, a set of state-action
production rules, or problem solving operations in a symbolic
representation. And, consequently, the same display configuration
may be interpreted as a pattern of signals for control of direct sensori-
motor manipulation, as signs which may act as cues for release of
heuristics, or as symbols for use in functional inference.
These aspects are important for decision support systems in
supervisory control of invisible processes of a process plant from
which only symbolic information is available. The domain is probably
of less importance in the control of accidents accessible to direct
observation and supported by verbal communication of information
and advice.
4. IMPLEMENTATION FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
It follows from the preceeding section that the most important domain
of analysis for emergency management will be the problem domain
and the decision task, including the role and cooperation of several
decision makers.
4.1. Problem Domain
The first aspect to consider will be the problem domain, i.e., the
representation of the relationships controlling the state of affairs in
the emergency management context.
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A representation in terms of a means-end hierarchy has proved to
be useful for supervisory process control as well as for problem
solving in general (Rasmussen, 1985). For supervisory process control
these relationships have been analysed and described systematically
along the part-whole and the means-end dimensions in order to have
a consistent framework for identification of the control requirements
of a system and the content of the related decision task. Also
emergency management is a resource management task in a purpose-
function-equipment hierarchy and adequacy of decision support
cannot be judged without an explicit description of the total system in
terms of the configuration and the state of available resources at each
level.
In the present case, the geographical location, physical resources
and functions of various emergency management services as well as
the physical characteristics of potential accident sources, can be
described in terms of the lower abstraction levels, while their
interaction can be represented at more general functional levels, and
safety policies and regulations are expressed at the highest levels of
abstraction. In the following sections, attempts will be made to
illustrate the problem space of the various scenarios in this
framework and to identify the information needed to analyse the
control and coordination requirements at each level, and the resulting
need for data, data integration, and communication. In the analysis
will be included a description of the propagation top-down in the
hierarchy from laws and regulations to procedures and instructions
at the lower functional levels.
A difference in comparison with supervisory process control will be
that in emergency management different decision makers will be
active at the various levels in the hierarchy, while in supervisory
control tasks in process plant control rooms, the same decision maker
may serve several levels. This will influence the communication
structure.
A sketch of the possible, typical content of the various levels may be
useful in order to illustrate the use of scenario analysis, of structuring
the description of rules and regulations, and of identification of the
kind of information which should be collected by interviews. In this
respect, it is important to realize a basic difference between the
problem space of supervisory process control and emergency
management: In process control, a decision maker is faced with a well
structured,  integrated system with well defined boundaries, and the
task is one of resource management to compensate for disturbances
by reconfiguration of the system. This means the disturbances
originate from faults in the same system, from which components are
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selected for compensatory actions, and the problem domain can be
described as one coherent assembly, well-known to the decision
maker.
For decision making in emergency control in general, outside plant
boundaries, the situation is different. The problem space consists of
two parts which are rather independent. One consists of the potential
sources of accidents, industrial plants spread around a geographical
area, occasional transport of dangerous substances, etc., and
potential targets for damage in terms of people and groups, which
may change dynamically, depending upon time of the day and the
year, as well as upon major collective events as sport games - in short
a dynamically changing set of sources and targets in a geographical
map.
The other includes the resources for accident control, which may be
called into use in case of an emergency. Again these resources do not
add up to an integrated system, but present themselves to the
decision maker as a distributed set of services which should be
activated and integrated into an effective system, the size and
configuration of which depend entirely upon the physical nature and
size of the actual emergency and its geographical location.
A description of the problem space should be  systematic
identification of the elements in these two domains which basically
constitutes sets of separate items in which only a subset will be
selected for consideration as an active physical system when they are
activated and interact during an accidental course of events. The
descriptions will, therefore, have the character of a general data base
including the relevant items together with all those physical and
functional characteristics which may be necessary for control of the
system which may emerge during accidents.
The two domains will have very different roles in the decision
making during emergency control, and the information needed for
their representation in a decision support system will be considered
separately since they will depend on different analysis and data
sources.
The discussion will be based on the abstraction hierarchy which
has been found to be useful for decision making modelling, and a
short description is included in the following section to support a
more detailed discussion of the content of a systematic description.
4.2. The Means-End Abstraction Hierarchy
Emergency management can be considered a resource management
problem in a means-end hierarchy representing the functional
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properties of the environment. In this hierarchy, these properties are
represented by concepts which belong to several levels of abstraction.
The lowest level of abstraction represents only the physical form of
the system, its material configuration. The next higher level
represents the physical processes or functions of the various
components and systems in a language related to their specific
electrical, chemical, or mechanical properties. Above this, the
functional properties are represented in more general concepts
without reference to the physical process or equipment by which the
functions are implemented, and so forth.
At the lower levels, elements in the process description match the
component configuration of the physical implementation. When
moving from one level of abstraction to the next higher level, the
change in system properties represented is not merely removal of
details of information on the physical or material properties. More
fundamentally, information is added on higher level principles
governing the cofunction of the various functions or elements at the
lower level. In man-made systems these higher level principles are
naturally derived from the purpose of the system, i.e., from the
reasons for the configurations at the level considered. Change of level
of abstraction involves a shift in concepts and structure for
representation, as well as a change in the information suitable to
characterize the state of the function or operation at the various levels
of abstraction. Thus an observer asks different questions to the
environment depending on the nature of the currently active internal
representation.
In other words, models at low levels of abstraction are related to a
specific physical world which can serve several  purposes or violate
different goals. Models at higher levels of abstraction are closely
related to a specific purpose which can be met by several  physical
arrangements. Therefore, shifts in the level of abstraction can be used
to change the direction of paths, suitable for transfer of knowledge
from previous cases and problems. At the two extreme levels of
models, the directions of the paths available for transfer are in a way
orthogonal, since transfer at one level follows physical, material
properties, while at the other it follows purpose.
Decisions during emergency management are related to correction
of the effects of disturbances and mitigation of accidents. Events can
only be defined as disturbances or accidents with reference to
acceptable states, normal function, or other variants of system
purpose or functional meaning. The functional models at the different
levels of abstraction play different roles in coping with disturbed
systems. Causes of improper functions (disturbances) are depending
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upon changes in the physical or material world. Thus they are
explained "bottom-up" in the levels of abstraction, whereas reasons
for proper or acceptable function are derived "top-down" from the
functional purpose.
A task for which the use of representations at several levels of
abstraction is of obvious value is design of technical systems and of
operating procedures. Basically, design is a process of iteration
between considerations at the various levels rather than an orderly
transformation from a description of purpose  to a description in
terms of physical materialization of a solution. There exists a many-
to-many mapping between the levels; a purpose can be served by
many physical configurations, and a physical system can serve many
purposes or have a variety of effects. The framework, should therefore
be useful in the present context, since emergency management
includes the ad hoc design of a mitigating system, and its subsequent
control.
Not only reasoning in such causal, physical systems should be
considered. For emergency management, not only prediction of the
response of physical systems is important.  Other persons and social
groups will be part of the system an emergency manager has to
control. As for technical systems, various levels of abstraction can be
used to model human "functional" properties. What is of particular
interest here is that, in ordinary working life, human interaction is
based on a "top-down" prediction drawn from perceptions of other
persons' intentions, motives, and on common sense representations of
human capabilities, together  with knowledge of accepted practice.
Causal bottom-up arguments  literally play no role, and the most
important information to use for planning human interactions for
unfamiliar occasions is therefore knowledge of the value structures
and myths of the work environment.
Physical systems with known and invariate internal structure are
responding to changes and to human acts according to basic laws of
nature which can therefore be used to predict their behaviour. They
are "causal systems", and their response to physical changes for
which no experience is available for an observer can be explained or
predicted by means of bottom-up reasoning in the abstraction
hierarchy, i.e., by functional analysis.
This approach is not possible for all the environment in which
humans have to make decisions. Systems with a high degree of
autonomous internal functioning, with self-organizing and highly
adaptive features, will change their internal functional organization
continuously in order to meet the requirements of the environment
and to suit their internal goals or performance criteria. Even though
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such systems are basically controlled by laws of nature, their
complexity in general makes it impossible to explain or predict their
performance by functional analysis during real life decision making.
The alternative is to consider such systems as "intentional systems"
controlled by motives or intentions together with the constraints on
performance posed by the environment - physically or in the form of
conventions and legal requirements - and by the limiting capabilities
of their internal mechanisms.
For emergency management systems, the information related to the
decision space will be discussed for the two separate categories
mentioned above, the domain of potential risk, and the domain of
mitigation resources.
4.3. Domain of Potential Risk
This part of the data base includes information identifying the
potential risk sources, their functional physical properties making it
possible to predict the accidental propagation of effects of accident
releasing mechanisms, and the possible higher level consequences in
relation to social norms and legal rules. This part of the data base will
supply the basis for the "upward" analytical part of the decision
ladder, and the information will be available from risk analysis,
technical manuals, and analysis of the technical features of prior
cases. Examples of the information at the various levels can be (figure
3):
Level of physical form. The content will typically be related to
identification of the elements of the total system, inventory
descriptions, appearance, configurations, and locations. In particular
this should include identifying information on location of special
accident potential, explosives, major chemical storage facilities, etc. In
general, information on geographical population densities and road
maps classified according to transport capabilities (traffic density and
speed, load capabilities, etc.) related to potential accident sources also
belong to this level. Sources of such information will be design
documentation from individual installations, statistical reviews,
reports from road authorities, geographical and demographical
institutes, technical support services of local government, etc.
Level of physical function. This level includes information on the
functional properties and limitations of the elements identified in the
lower level, i.e., information specifying what they can be used for,
what can be done to them, what they can do in terms of damage, etc.
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Figure 3. Domain of potential risk.
This level identifies the functional properties of generally speaking
two categories: Information necessary to identify accident
mechanisms, to predict courses of events, and to judge effects of
countermeasures.  The category includes functional characteristics of
hazardous installations and equipment, their typical behaviour during
various categories of accidents, and their responses to possible means
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of intervention; characteristics of chemical ingredients in terms of
toxidity, fire and pollution characteristics, and their reactions to
means for fire extinction, cleaning, and medical treatment.
The information in this category will to a large extent include data
extracted from analysis of previous cases, derived by risk analysis,
and the use of the characteristics of the means-end relations should
be considered carefully when the formats applied to document the
results of such analysis are chosen and the data bases are organised.
This will be considered in more detail below.
Level of general function. At this level the description is in terms of
requirements for general functions during the various circumstances
without consideration of the underlying physical mechanisms or
processes. At this level, general functions and consequences of, for
instance, propagation of fires, explosions, flooding, etc., can be
considered irrespective of their physical origin.
Information at this level is in general included in professional
textbooks, it may be generalizations from analysis of previous cases,
from laboratory experiments, or derived deductively from more basic
scientific theories.
Level of abstract function. This level may be useful to represent
abstract descriptions of the interrelation of various general functions
in terms of material flow characteristics, economic properties, general
polution characteristics, etc.
The level will include abstract measures which are without physical
or causal dimension and which, can therefore be used to compare,
prioritize, and coordinate lower level general functions. Such
measures are for instance monetary values and flows; flow and
inventory of (possibly unspecified) mass or energy; probability
measures like risk, reliability; etc. These measures are all well suited
to interrelate the effects of generic functions and to relate them to
higher level goals and constraints.
A possible application of this level may be to represent the rule sets
and regulations derived from primary laws by central organisations
and the higher level institutional control and monitoring of activities
and monetary expenditures as a reference for judgement and
prioritizing regarding the potential for damage from different physical
sources.
The level of purpose. This level specifies the basic purposes and
restrictions for the decision making. For emergency management, it
can be used to represent legal requirements, regulations on
acceptable risk, limits of polution, economic constraints, as well as
institutional goals and criteria. In addition, social and institutional
goals and criteria, public opinion pressure, etc., whether implicitly or
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explicitly formulated, should be considered for representation at this
level.
Domain of Emergency Management Resources
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Figure 4. Domain of emergency management resources
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4.4. The Mitigation Resource Domain
This domain includes the information about functions, processes, and
equipment/personnel which is available to form the counteracting
and mitigating force. It represents the problem space for the
"downward" planning leg of the decision ladder. The information
included at the various levels can for instance include (figure 4):
Level of physical form. The content will typically be related to
identification of the elements of the total system, inventory
descriptions, amount, numbers, appearance, locations. In particular
this should include identification of geographical locations of services,
such as hospitals, fire brigades, etc; with identification of resources in
terms of types and amount of equipment and personnel; major
mechanical tools (cranes, tractors, bus service (for evacuation); all
items together with information about service availability and delays,
road access, distances.
In general, information on geographical population densities and
road maps classified according to transport capabilities (traffic
densities and speeds, load capabilities) belongs to this level.
Sources of this information will be the description and drawings of
the locations and inventories of the various rescue and mitigation
services.
Level of physical function. This level includes information on the
functional properties and limitations of the elements identified in the
lower level, i.e., information specifying what they can be used for,
what can be done to them, what they can do in terms of damage, etc.
This level identifies the functional properties and specification of
resources which will enable planning of mitigation, such as the
capability of all the equipment and tools available, the professional
abilities of the personnel categories listed for the various services and
groups. Also the organisation of this part of the data base should be
based on a careful analysis of user needs in terms of means-end
relations.
The information at this level specifies the accidental mechanisms
which the emergency management has to face and the functions
available for coping. The mapping onto the lower level identifies the
physical possibilities of events and availability of physical resources.
Level of general function. At this level the description is in terms of
requirements for general functions during the various circumstances
and the availability of resources without consideration of the
underlying physical mechanisms or processes. Functions at this level
may be the functions of and available resources for alarming, fire-
fighting, transport, evacuation, cleaning, medical first aid,
communication, etc.
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At this level, the integrated activities and requirements for various
categories of major events are described in order to evaluate
requirements for coordination of the individual functions and for
prioritising and allocating of activities to operational units. The
context at this level is suited for allocation of authority and for
coordination of activities from units of different organisational origin.
Level of abstract function. This level may be useful to represent
abstract descriptions of the interrelation of various general functions
in terms of material flow characteristics, economic properties, general
polution characteristics, etc.
A possible application of this level may be to represent the rule sets
and regulations derived from primary laws by central organisations
and the higher level institutional control and monitoring of activities
and monetary expenditures related to various services and activities.
The level may be the focal level of setting  priorities of resources for
various aspects of purposes and constraints, being in abstract terms
not relating to specific purposes or implementations.
The level of purpose. Information at this level specifies goal and
constraints for industrial safety in general, and the same kind of
information will be basis for the planning of emergency management,
and for constraining industrial risk potential.
It is interesting to note that the representation of the potential risk
domain and the mitigation domain in a way joins at the level of
purposes and goals. At this level the general policy and value
judgement take place, and from here the implications propagate top-
down through the potential risk and the mitigation resource domains.
The policy and goal level is determining the acceptable risk and,
therefore, both the acceptable content of the potential risk landscape,
and the funding and strategy for resources made available for
emergency management.
4.5. The Use of Problem Representation
This representation of the problem space will be a multi-level
representation in terms available/required equipment-process-
function-purpose elements, and decision making in a specific
situation will be a resource management task aiming at a proper
relationship in the potential many-to-many mapping between the
levels. A property of the total emergency management system
considered at an individual level can be characterised in three
different ways, (1) "what" it is, i.e. its causal properties in interactions
at that particular level, (2) "why" it may be chosen, i.e., its role at the
next higher level, and (3) "how" it may be implemented by resources at
the next lower level. This means that the data element in a data base
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should be characterised from at least three different points of view.
Decision making in a particular situation will be an iterative
consideration of the resources at the various levels until a satisfactory
relationship through the levels has been identified, connecting the
various, possibly conflicting, goals and constraints with the available
physical resources. This will involve the task of keeping track of a
many-to-many mapping in a complex net, and the use of information
technology should be considered not only for advice giving à la expert
system, but also for support of the decision process itself (for instance
by alerting the user to consider other relevant means-end mappings
than the one behind an actual information request). The relevance of
this depends, however, on the extent to which activities are
stereotyped and rule-bound, and judgement will depend on the
practical experience obtained from the analysis of some more
complicated cases stories (who will have access to a computer in the
whole process? Somebody in a command center with radio link to a
data centre? For which category of accidents will that be realistic?
The nature and the related sources of information to be included in
a data base should be specified for each of the cells in the domain
abstraction/decomposition matrix (figures 5 and 6).
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Figure 5: Domain of Potential Risk: Information Sources
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Figure 6. Domain of Emergency Management: Information Sources
Data types to consider together with their sources will be:
•orders (in terms of goals), intentional statements, etc. (from
preplanning or from level above),
•procedural information (from preplanning or from cooperators at
same level),
•state information in actual situation (from communication
sources),
•models (structural, causal information, from textbooks, risk
analysis, incident analysis).
A specific problem to consider is the interface between risk
analysis, incident analysis, equipment manuals and data bases for
emergency mangement, with respect to formats for reporting
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assumptions, and  intermediate results. The importance of proper
specification of the explicit format of assumptions, models, and
results of risk analyses, has been discussed in detail by Rasmussen
and Pedersen (1984). This discussion also has implications for risk
management.
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The form in which the information should be stored in the data
base depends entirely upon the users' formulation of their problem
and needs (cf. Pejtersen's work on information retrieval in libraries).
This, in turn, depends on the identity of the actual decision maker,
and the boundaries of his information needs in terms of location in
the problem space chart (see figure 7), as well as upon the
hierarchical structure of the operating organisation. Will, for instance,
the organisation be strictly hierarchical, as a military command
organisation in which each person is clearly related to a function in
the hierarchy, and (ideally, at least) only communicates orders
downwards in the form of goals to achieve, not the ways to do it. In
this kind of system, the information to be communicated between
persons, and the kind of information they will seek in the data base
can be identified. However, in normal, civil organisations, people do
not stick to their roles, and the same individual will probably be
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moving between levels. This may give ambiguity in the search phrases
for data from the data base, and communication between levels may
be through a person shifting levels, rather than by person-to-person
exchange, (i.e., will a person look after information at the level he at
the moment cognitively will be at, or will he look from levels above and
below?). The perception of the task by the individual participants in a
case should be carefully studied, together with the way the task and
information need is expressed, in particular, the redundancy in the
verbal terms with reference to the problem space characteristics
should be considered. In the analysis it may be a help to compare
situations or activities which were considered particularly successful
or the opposite by the participants. Is there a difference in the
distribution of these cases in the problem space? Considering the
assistance needed, the support systems to consider may be different
for different persons, and consequently be depending on the
localization in the problem space.
Another aspect of a strict hierarchical structure which should be
considered in the analysis of cases is the (theoretical) lack of contact
between groups at the same level. Does a problem appear if the rescue
company "Falck", the public fire brigades, and the civil defense corps,
cooperate in firefighting, and the hierarchical structure is respected?
For the effective use of information, it should be considered that the
selection and formulation of information to present should reflect and
distinguish the different alternatives of action. The number of action
alternatives are decreasing down through the levels. In this respect
the information should be clearly operational, and the implications in
terms of action alternatives, and in constraints on their choice, should
be represented in a way that can be used in search terms. Frequent
errors are related to not using an action alternative, rather than to
doing something wrong.
It should be carefully considered that the amount of information
and the complexity/diversity (in a specific, dynamic situation, at least)
will increase downward through the hierarchy. This will probably be
reflected in the organisational structure if it is assumed that the
evolution will have aimed at equal complexity for the individual
decision makers.
The data base representing the problem domain in terms of risk
potential and emergency management resources will include
structural information about functional properties and causal
relationships which must be transformed into procedural information
in order to be operational in the actual accident situation. This
transformation can be based on heuristics derived from prior
experience or deductions based on state information from the case
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actually present. If procedural transformations are incorporated in the
data base, it will have to be rather general rules, or very specific
retrieval attributes must be defined. If the procedural information
have to be generated on-site, it will either have to be done by the
decision maker himself, or information on the actual state of affairs
will have to be transmitted to the advisor in possession of the
necessary general background knowledge or the intermediary working
on the available data bases. See figs. 8-9. This advisor can be a
human domain expert or a n "expert system inference machine"
attached to the data base.
The conclusion of this preliminary analysis is that the means-end
hierarchy is well suited to structure the information content of the
data base which is underlying emergency management decisions,
during preplanning as well as during the actual situations. Thus
structured, it will be possible in a consistent way to identify the
proper search terms to use for retrieval design, and to specify the
format in which information should be supplied by the numerous
data sources, such as risk analysis, incident analysis, plant design,
operations planning, and inspections. The analysis of actual cases will
serve to make such rules explicit by means of selected examples.
Decision 
Maker
Interpretation 
of goals & Ends
Interpretation of 
State of Affairs
Locus of 
Analysis 
& Control
Figure 8. Locus of control.
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4.6. The decision process
Another dimension in the modelling framework to consider is a
description of the decision process. A preliminary analysis indicates
that the "decision ladder" used for systems control will be useful for
the present purpose, structuring the decision in terms of situation
analysis, evaluation and goal identification, activity planning, and
execution. In particular the ladder should be useful for the
representation of the interaction between preplanned decisions , their
implementation in rules and standing orders, and on-site decision
making. An important part of the analysis of specific cases will be to
evaluate the degree to which activities are rule-based, and to identify
the relevant rules and their origin (formal or heuristic?).
In addition, the cooperation between several decision makers can
be represented, in particular the cooperation across the levels of the
means-end hierarchy which, in the present context, will also be levels
in the lines of command. This means it will be necessary to identify
the person in charge of the different data processing functions of the
"ladder", and the content and form of information needed for
communication during cooperative decision making. During planning,
the sequential consideration of different goals and constraints by
different decision makers should be considered (cf. the analyses of
Cyert and March, 1963). Are the decision makers in accident control
cooperating, or are they sequentially solving the problems as they
appear? For instance, do the fire brigade people just try to put out the
fire, or do they consider the problem of restauration which they leave
for the demolition team in terms of water and mechanical damage?
Analysis of case stories should include a description identifying
decision makers in the overall organisation and the content of their
decisions in the means-end hierarchy.
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In order to specify the information need, at least three different
decision scenarios should probably be considered:
1. Long term planning of mitigation resources and procedures,
2. alarming and task force selection and organisation in case
of emergency, and
3. situation analysis and control during action.
For each of the subprocesses of the ladder, it should be specified:
• who is the performer?
• when is the decision made (preplanning or in situation)?
•what information is needed (source and category (state,
structural, procedural, or itentional))?
• where is it in the problem space matrix?
• who is the reciever?
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4.7. Decision strategies
In order to identify information needs, the effective strategies for the
different phases of the decision process should be determined.
Material for diagnosis is already available, but situation analysis,
more broadly, and planning should be reviewed. Strategies for higher
level control of distributed decision making, in particular, should be
considered. Some correlation between the planning strategies in
emergency management and the strategies behind current expert
system support should be made possible.
4.8. Information Retrieval Strategies
Finally, the question of organisation of information retrieval in data
bases is being considered. In supervisory control of process systems,
the information needed for resource management within the means-
end hierarchy is typically configuration data for a rather well
structured and stable system, together with data derived from
measured physical variables in that system. Characteristics of the
data base involved, therefore, pose no basic problem.
For emergency management, the situation is different. The physical
system underlying the courses of events is badly structured and its
constituents and properties will be unfamiliar to the decision makers.
Important information will depend not on measurements and analysis
but on judgements based on experience from previous "similar" cases.
Design of data bases which make data from previous technical
analysis, design information, data from previous cases in the form of
heuristic rules, will require a systematic taxonomy with retrieval
attributes compatible with a user's changing needs during the
decision task.
Taxonomies already developed for human error classification and
information retrieval in libraries (Pejtersen, 1980) are being
considered for adaptation to the present project, to gain a taxonomy
compatible with the structure of the means-end hierarchy. The long-
range aim is guidelines for analysis of incident reports and design of
retrieval systems. The experience with the existing data bases on
properties of characteristics of potentially hazardous chemical
substances has been that too much information is returned from
queries (see the following sections for more details). Therefore,
systematic attempts must be made to transfer the know-how from
library systems in terms of proper formulation of search terms and
language control of synonyms and related terms before the data base
entry.
The elements in a data base should be characterised along all the
dimensions of a user's needs, and, therefore be compatible with the
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concepts used by users. Several different categories  of  relationship
among  concepts  will be used for different purposes.  The  most
typical  categories we have met in protocols and interviews  are
mentioned  here:
•Of basic importance are relations along the means-end dimension,
i.e., the relation between the levels of the problem space. Along this
dimension information is found what functions or objects can be used
for, or about how they can be realised. This dimension is of primary
importance in resource management.
• To  label or name objects,  answering questions  like:  what  is
this?", set membership relations of a generic hierarchy will be used.
This  kind  of category will be familiar from  biological classification,  a
technical example could  be:  process  plant component - pump -
centrifugal pump - specific type of pump. This dimension will be
important, for instance, to classify chemical substances into generic
categories which have in advance been characterised with respect to
toxidity, explosiveness, etc.
• To discuss  what  a  given  piece  of  equipment  is  composed  of,
consideration    is    structured   according   to    whole-part
relationships  in a decomposition  hierarchy,  such  as:  Diesel
generator  - oil supply system - injection pump - pump  bearing.
Information of this category may be useful to infer presence of certain
equipment, or substances from more general characterisations, for
instance to identify the equipment resources available when calling a
specific rescue team.
• In order to  identify  or describe objects or substances, categories
in terms of descriptive attributes  are  used,   frequently,   however,
represented  by prototype  members, is there anything similar to XXX
which caused us problems at the incident at --?
•  To predict  the course  of  events  during an accident and the
effects of intervention, cause-and-effect relationships are  used to
predict the propagation  of  changes through a system.
•  It should be mentioned here that relationships are  frequently
found  which  cut  across  these  more   formal categories, being
episodic relationships referring to the context of prior experience. In
the present context, this point of view will be important to
characterize the previous cases which may be the primary source of
data for the expert system.
The conclusion of this discussion is that the question of the
systematic identification of subjective formulation of roles and
information needs will be an important topic. The interviews in the
present feasibility study will only serve to scratch the surface but,
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hopefully, good examples can be found for formulation of the need for
more detailed studies.
5. ORGANIZATION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN DENMARK
5.1. Laws and Regulations
5.1.1. Fire service and fire commander
The duties and responsibilities of a chief fire officer, as well as the
organization of emergency forces at the scene of an accident have
been settled through the Fire Services Act. Danish law has been
consulted, as this forms the basis for the following case studies.
Information needs will very much depend on the user situation and
his background. The case study in a following section is based on
firemen's reports, and interpretation in terms of information handling
therefore requires one to have some knowledge about the job, the
organization, and the educational background.
The basic education of the fire brigade personnel is supposed to be
broadly identical to common European practice, but the organization
of fire services and of emergency operations is known to differ
somewhat. Therefore, the present section is reviewing relevant Danish
laws.
It is characteristic that a fire officer will be the leader on the scene
of the accident in most types of accidents, including cases involving
hazardous chemicals, no matter if there is a fire potential involved,
too.
The Fire Services Act (Brandloven, 1976) requires every local
authority to arrange a fire organization covering both inspection of
buildings, etc., and emergency service. Concerning the last matter,
the local authority can have this job done by the neighbouring
authority, or by a private firm. Requirements to education and
training, equipment, etc., are defined by the Ministry of Justice which
is the ministry governing fire as well as police organizations.
Chapter 3 of the Fire Services Act describes measures in case of
fire, covering alarm, immediate actions, fire service operations, police
assistance, and assistance from neighbouring forces and civil defense
forces or military personnel. In this chapter it is stated that command
on the fire site during fire mitigation and rescue operations is
exercised by the chief fire officer or his representative. The chief fire
officer is the person responsible for both the fire inspection work and
the fire service arrangement of the local authority. Fire commander
will be used below to title that member of the group of chief fire officer
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and representatives, who is on duty and is controlling the actual
emergency operations on the scene of the accident.
When an emergency occurs, the job of a fire commander is more
thoroughly laid down in the ministry's "Chief Fire Officer Instruction"
(Instruks, 1983): Section 8 of this instruction reads (unofficial
translation):
"In case of fire, explosion, accident with dangerous substance,
building collapse, train accident, aircraft accident on land, and ship
accident at the pier, the fire commander controls all technical
emergency operations at the scene of the accident. ... During very large
peacetime accidents, the head of police will coordinate all emergency
operations. ... The command structure is shown in Fig. 10 adopted
from (Instruks, 1983).
During the inspection work, the chief fire officer is obliged to reduce
the fire risk in hotels, industry, storage areas and any other place
with more than average fire risk. Through this work he is able to
collect information on such objects that may one day be significant
fire locations. The Fire Services Act does not specify emergency plans
to the made for the principal fire objects, but the Chief Fire Officer
Instruction requires the chief fire officer to develop "meeting plans" for
such objects where significant risks can be foreseen in case of fire. A
meeting plan may cover:
- specification of first force and perhaps second force
- preferred route station to site
- preferred access points
- preferred start positions on the site, water supplies, etc.
Extensive emergency plans are presently not required by the Fire
Services Act, but such plans are worked out in special cases,
including oil refineries for example.
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Figure 10
5.1.2. Accidents with dangerous substances
The local fire services have special equipment and are trained to
control minor accidents of this sort. Therefore, the local fire service
constitutes Step 1 of the general Danish emergency plan for
dangerous substances, described in a guidance from the
Environmental Protection Agency (Farlige stoffer, 1974).
Step 2 of this plan will include further mobilization of forces with
more specialized equipment, situated at selected fire stations, etc.
Eventually, Step 3 may be activated, in which case assistance is
acquired from the nearest Civil Defense Center, which is able to
control larger pollution cases. The civil defense forces may also bring
communication staff and equipment to build necessary
communication lines.
The guidance lists several services and authorities which may be of
some help in the accident situation: ambulances, hospitals, medical
personnel, labour inspectorate, road authorities, advisers on
chemistry and poison, etc. The guidance on dangerous substance
emergencies does not add to or modify the command structure given
through the Fire Services Act and shown in fig. 11.
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5.2. Release of Hazardous Chemicals
5.2.1. The problem
As described above, the organization set up to manage hazardous
release is a modification of the organization for fire emergencies. Also
the chemical accident has to be controlled by a fire commander, but
special equipment and clothing will be available, and an advising
system has been established towards hazardous chemicals. These
arrangements and this entirely new working field have been developed
within the last ten years, and practical experience with the systems
will be rather limited.
Today's fire commander has to rely very much on external
knowledge, while in this situation he himself is not the expert. Even
an experienced chemist would have to depend heavily on handbooks,
measurements, and calculations to aid rational decision work.
Accidental fire is much more recognizable to a human than most
chemical releases. Some characteristics will therefore trouble even a
future emergency commander with more experience on this matter,
and perhaps more theoretical knowledge.
The chemicals that may be involved in transport accidents, or be
released during industrial accidents, are innumerable, and new
chemical compounds are invented every day. Most chemicals do not
expose humans to immediate danger, but many chemicals will
represent a risk factor when complete ecosystems are considered.
A chemical may bear several identification marks: trade names,
professional names, formulas, digit codes, etc. There will sometimes
be signs painted or labelled on the container, on walls, road signs,
etc., telling about the risk and perhaps stating procedures in case of
release. In cases when the identity cannot be obtained from labels,
signs, accompanying persons, etc., one often tries to use observable
characteristics: colour, odour, weight, viscosity, etc., and perhaps
comparison with well known substances. This leads to pure guessing
work, even if such identification is made with telephone contact to an
expert. When an early identification does not succeed, it will be
necessary to mobilize a specific expert or a general expert. The former
may be a representative of an involved company or of another firm
using the same class of compounds. The general expert will be an
analyst who can work out an identification with proper indicators and
perhaps laboratory work.
When a proper identification has been made, chemical data can be
found in handbooks and other general sources. Business interests
may restrict available information about certain chemicals, and this
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represents a practical but not a principal problem relating to the
feasibility of expert systems.
Today's expert system in Denmark for the management of
hazardous release centres around two main blocks; a set of chemical
emergency cards supposed to be a standard tool for field use in the
emergency organization, and a 24 hours advisory system. This
situation will be described in the following two sections.
5.2.2. Chemical emergency cards
More than a hundred cards have been worked out and distributed by
the Civil Defence authorities to fire brigades, hospitals, railways, etc.
Every card gives all the information pertinent to one specific chemical,
under these standard headings:
means for protection
procedures in case of accident
dangerous properties
further characteristics (physical constants, recommended dose
limits, hints for analysis)
suggestions for the doctor
cleaning of equipment and tools
references to handbooks and data bases.
The procedure section starts by giving a general procedure for the
first attack, for example in the case of tetramethylplumban:
"Personal protection. Attack in the direction of the wind. Rescue of
injured persons. Evacuation (at first: 4 km in wind direction, 2.5 km
zone width). In the outer 2/3 part of the zone, or by short (below
totally 30 minutes) release, "stay indoors" will be appropriate. In case
of explosion risk: safe distance: 600 metres. Call expert assistance
(use telephone list)."
The procedure section goes on specifying release control, operations
on environment, fire fighting, human reactions after exposure, first
aid, and prevalence of the chemical.
Dangerous properties are listed under: fire and explosion,
poisonous effects, characterization, reactions, environmental danger.
The section ends up by giving further names of the chemical,
including a few common trade names.
To find the relevant card, one needs a UN number and the standard
name: 1649, TETRAMETHYLBLY. The system register leads to "1649"
from several names, including German, British and French standard
designations as well as TML, Octel TML, and Octel Mix, etc. The UN
number can frequently be found on containers, tank cars, storage
tanks and may be accompanied by a three digits danger code stating
in priority order the most important hazard characteristics.
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5.2.3. Advisory system
The description of this system has been extracted from Sonnich
Thomsen (1984a).
An advisory group based in the Civil Defence analytical-chemical
laboratory can be contacted day or night. This arrangement has been
open to fire brigades etc. since 1978. Out of working hours the group
consists of four chemists who are familiar with the problems on the
scene of an accident, and who are engaged in relevant R&D activities.
A goal for the advisors would be that they are able to provide the most
urgent advice within, say, 10 minutes. Answers may cover both
chemical information and approximate responses.
In serious or complicated cases, the chemical advisor will move
himself to the scene of the accident. Analyses to find identity or
concentration can be made by the Civil Defence units in "step 3" of
the emergency organization for chemical accidents, mentioned
previously, or by the Civil Defence Chemical Analytical Laboratory.
According to the Danish Fire Inspection (Haurum, 1985) a
development is under way with this information gathering system.
The Civil Defence Analytical Laboratory is about to establish
communication lines into the German TUIS-system. The "Transport-
Unfall-Informations- und Hilfeleistungs-System" is made up by large
chemical companies and oil companies to deliver these services:
a.  advice via telephone
b.  on the spot advice from experts
c.  assistance with equipment and personnel by very large
accidents.
Obviously, a large group of experts will be accessible that way who
can supply specialist knowledge out of the reach of any central
laboratory.
5.2.4. User problems
The route from a greasy substance spilled on the ground or a strange
smell during an industrial fire, to the most appropriate response may
be a very long one to follow. Fire commanders have added to their job
a lot of data handling with no parallel in the normal work of a fire
brigade.
Already the identification of the actual chemical, and the
preparation, concentration, etc. may be troublesome, if labels of
documents are missing or some mixture or intermediate product of a
chemical process is involved. The identification of unknown
compounds has no appeal to the fire commander except as the
necessary key to his information sources. What he really needs is the
code translating his observations to appropriate  response guidelines.
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I want:   necessary precautions and suggested procedures for
reaction.
I have:   large tank leaking greenish, heavy fluid with no particular
smell. The site is a furniture factory.
This fictive example shows that most fixed data sources may be
surpassed by the expert who is able to work backwards in his
knowledge space. As put by Sonnich Thomsen: suppose the fire
commander observes a red coloured chemical, when the expert
programmer had seen a pink coloured one, and ordered his data
input accordingly.
Sonnich Thomsen (1984b) reports statistics from 151 acute cases
where he was called as a member of the group of four expert
chemists. The trouble to translate names for the purpose of chemical
identification is illustrated by this table:
TABLE 1. The distribution of chemical names and trade names.
(Sonnich Thomsen 1984b).
_______________________________________________________________
Immediately understandable chemical names 53%
Trade names:
- easily found in the literature 17.1%
- difficult to "translate" 9.9%
- impossible to "translate" 6.6%
- total 34%
Other 13%
6. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED DANISH ACCIDENTS
Specific accident experience and examples have been gathered from
10 selected accidents in Denmark, covering the period 1978 to 1984.
Information about these cases has been collected mainly from the
principal Danish periodical on this matter: "Brandværn", which is
issued every month and reports most Danish as well as selected
foreign fire cases and accidents with dangerous substances.
The criteria for choosing these 10 cases were that environmental
effects or the threat of such effects should be a principal factor in any
selected case. There are no large-scale disaster in the group, but
potential disasters were faced in most cases. The sample is therefore
supposed to give a fair representation of both typical and severe
problems of a fire commander when he is in charge of an accident
outside the every week routines.
6.1. Case List
The following 10 cases have been selected:
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1. Kolding,   780704.   Fire in a factory producing preser-vation fluids
for wood. Threat: smoke withpoisonous sub-stances.
2. Stigsnæs,  781011.   Oil refinery fire. Threat: exploding equipment
and tanks, pollution with oil products and smoke.
3. Nørresundby, 800131  Liquified gas release when loading a storage
tank from a railway tank waggon. Threat: gas cloud spread in the
residential areas of a city.
4. Stigsnæs,  800714    Oil refinery fire. Threat: Cf. case 2 above.
5. Copenhagen, 800715   Explosion in extraction plant for vegetable
fat. Threat: Spread of explosive vapours to traffic area and nearby
residence, long-distance effects of explosion at the plant.
6. Ålborg,    820919    Petrol release from transfer line in the ground.
Threat: ground pollution, danger of explosion in sewers.
7. Fredensborg, 830109  Chemical reaction turns hot outside working
hours. Threat: Spread of poisonous gases.
8. Copenhagen, 831110   Container leak during transport of
chemical, suspected to be phenol. Threat: water pollution and
spread of poisonous vapours.
9. Hillerød, 830910     Motor-carleft filling station without disengaging
filling hose for liquified gas. Threat: gas cloud.
10. Highway, 840120      Turned over tank-car on highway. Petrol
spill. Threat: Pollution of ground and lake. Explosive vapours in
sewer system.
Case 1, Kolding
During transport of 10 litre bins with preservation fluids inside the
store for finished products, some bins were overturned, and fluid was
spilled. The product gave off flammable vapours, and these were
ignited, when personnel in the area tried to control the release using
saw dust. It has been supposed afterwards that ignition arised from a
creeping foil unit, which continued operation at the moment.
Already before his arrival to the scene of the accident, the fire
commander ordered all disposable forces called, due to the violent
smoke observed. Upon arrival, alarm was given also to fire services
from neighbouring districts and to the nearest civil defense center.
Efforts to stop the fire did not succeed until three hours later, when
almost the whole factory had burnt down. The factory was contained
in one building, complete with stores, administrative functions,
canteen, etc. Characteristic troubles with this fire were:
large amounts of flammable solvents
misjudgement of fire resistance of walls, etc.
low pressure in water supply
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vast amounts of preservation fluid washed down with water.
The first strategy seemed to be stopping the fire in the storage area
where it started. However, the walls did not resist a fire which was so
well "fuelled" by solvents, and forces had to be withdrawn step by
step, until at the end the forces shifted their efforts towards saving
more distant objects. Two storage tanks outside the factory building
were cooled by firemen, an ignition was avoided, partly also due to a
suitable wind direction.
The very early alarms for further assistance may indicate that the
fire commander did expect a very large fire potential caused by the
substances used and stored at the factory. The firm was - and still is -
a well-known factory in the area, and the potential for fire as well as
poisonous gases has been common knowledge to the local fire service.
Surprise may have come from structural characteristics and water
supply pressure.
A local firegroup existed in this company, but it was not activated
due to the violent character of the fire. However, a specialist from the
company prepared himself to assist public efforts directed towards
environmental pollution. Civil defense personnel performed repeated
surveys around the site to monitor the concentrations of dangerous
substances and products of combustion.
A pollution control crew of the civil defense organization succeeded
in stopping pollution of the nearby inlet. A 150,000 kg mixture of
water and preservation fluid was removed, to be transported to
"Kommunekemi", a public plant for destruction of dangerous
substances.
The case raises a general and very important problem, where fire
commanders may experience great dilemmas. With such fires,
pollution may result no matter which strategy is followed. The fire
commander may choose among rather different courses:
putting out the fire as expedient as possible will cause large
amounts of chemical substances to end in the sewerage and perhaps
in a lake or inlet
the quite opposite strategy will produce more smoke and probably
air pollution with hazardous chemicals.
An expert system might help the fire commander work out raw
classifications of risk.
Valuable information to the fire commander in the Kolding case
might have included:
fire potential of wood preservation fluids
fire resistance characteristics of the type of structural elements
used in the factory
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typical burn-through times of the actual constellations of "fuel" and
concrete walls, etc.
combustion products and parameters to evaluate the spreading and
the need for evacuation
water supply data
layout of sewers in the area.
Most of the problems were solved in the end without using any
expert system, but presenting some of this information earlier in the
run might have saved valuable time and would probably have directed
the attention towards a more efficient strategy. Some of this
information has presumably been in the possession of local authority
departments, and some even in the fire inspection files, but not in a
form suitable or accessible from the scene of the accident. General
information on wood preservation fluids would have to be obtained
from national or international knowledge banks.
Case_2,_Stigsnæs_1978
This case is a serious one, in that one person died after the accident
as a result of burns he acquired immediately after arrival to the plant
where the fire evolved.
The oil refinery has its own fire brigade, and this was alarmed when
a small fire started by an oil oven. The alarm was signalled to the
public fire service simultaneously, and in this way three levels of
emergency operation were initiated at the same time:
the public fire service started mobilization
the refinery fire brigade was activated
people at the actual plant started mitigation efforts
When the refinery chief fire officer and his assistant arrived to the
site and went out of the fire engine, a sudden burst of fire stuck the
two men and the car. The chief fire officer died later from his burns.
The fire engine burnt out completely.
Process control personnel now signalled "disaster alarm", and
continued shut-down procedure and mitigation. The local fire brigade
had started cooling with water monitors, when the first public unit
arrived. In total a lot of 29 fire engines and 98 men were called to the
refinery from outside.
A radioactive source in the plant was localized and removed from
the accident area. A search for injured and trapped persons in the
plant was conducted, but all had escaped. After the plant had been
shut down, mitigation was easily completed. Vast amounts of process
equipment had been destroyed by this fire, but no harmful effects
were reported for environment or public.
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In cases like this, however, there are very large fire potentials
involved and the fire commander may have to face questions like:
fire spread outside the refinery?
spill to ground, sewers, etc.?
missiles from ignited volumes of refinery products?
air pollution?
Oil refinery plants in different countries must have several common
characteristics, and one must assume that certain approaches and
general hints would be useful for the fire commander. In cases where
well informed personnel from the refinery is available, these may help
the commander to classify fire, plant, and equipment in such a way
that specific questions can be phrased, and more useful answers
obtained.
Input to an expert system could be types of product, plant
equipment, etc. The answers could be obtained as risk ordering and
simple rules such as suggested safety zones and procedures for
localizations and removal of radiation sources.
Case 3, Nørresundby
The inlet of Limfjorden passes between the Ålborg town area and the
Nørresundby town area in the northern part of Jutland. On an
everyday noon the fire service got the message "outflow of gas due to
an open valve on a railway tank-car". Three railway cars were parked
in a special discharging area close to a big tank store for liquified gas.
Discharge to the tank store was going on when a flange connection
failed due to gas pressure, and gas was let out in the open air. The
personnel tried unsuccessfully to close a safety valve, but this did not
operate, because this operation had not been prepared properly before
discharging of the actual tank car had begun.
This event happened under cold weather conditions, and the fire
personnel arrived to a large cloud of vapour and gas. At first they were
misinformed by the gas people, and tried to turn the wrong tank-car
off. At the second attempt they operated on the right car, and
eventually succeeded in stopping the outflow.
The operation was troublesome and rather dangerous to the
firemen. Cold weather and evaporation of the gas combined to give
rather low working temperatures and thus the firemens' boots and
gas mask windows were covered by ice.
In parallel to these operations, a warning was given to residents in
the affected area, and traffic was stopped on roads and railway lines.
2 1/2 hours after the alarm, the gas cloud had dissipated and traffic
restrictions could be cancelled. More than 13,000 kg of liquified gas
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had been released to the environment, but no serious consequences
were recorded.
The fire commander has considered the risk of explosion and the
consequence if the stored gas volumes had been involved, too, as a
secondary effect. Dangers to the public are obvious in this case, but
the operation was conducted to a lucky end under rather bad working
conditions. Many questions are raised: emergency plans?, suitable
tools and operating procedures?, etc. The fire commander might use
these types of information in the case:
how far does the zone of potential explosion stretch, when
comparing with the region occupied by the visible gas cloud?
for how long may the gas flow continue, when the tank car has
contained 26,000 kg?
are there schools, nursery homes, hospitals, which may be affected
by the gas cloud and may need extra warning time?
which organizations should start thinking now, because the
explosion is a very real possibility? (Disaster prewarning).
Case 4, Stigsnæs 1980
In the desulphurization plant, light fuel oil leaked out and was
ignited. This started a chain of events:
burst in 6" pipe with hydrogen and fuel oil
a moment later a 12" pipe with hydrogen and naphta broke
burning fluids were sprayed around and a third pipe burst later on.
Observation of the fire led immediately to external alarm and to
activation of the own fire brigade of the refinery. Sprinkling and
cooling with water monitors was started and shut down of the actual
plant initiated. When the public fire service arrived, they proceeded
with cooling operations, and prepared for extinction. A command post
was established for communication purposes and for distribution and
coordination of the forces. The first alarm message had activated five
fire engines, four ambulances, and several diverse units.
The fire was put out 2 1/2 hours after the alarm and extensive
material losses had resulted with complete destruction of very large
plant components.
This may be looked upon as a case where public fire service worked
merely as a more powerful continuation of a local fire brigade. They
added highly trained firemen, but much equipment and material was,
however, already available in the refinery. When emergency operations
have been organized in advance, and risks are considered in the
everyday routine, the best experts can be found among local
personnel.
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When fire may evolve violently and strike several plants at the site,
the fire commander has to consider:
where do I get extra water?
which plants, tanks, etc. must not be caught by fire?
Even if these are internal problems, external effects will depend on
the success to avoid disaster. Information about release, air pollution,
etc. is mentioned above, case 2 which took place at the same refinery.
Case 5, Copenhagen (A)
The explosion of an extraction plant in "Dansk Sojakagefabrik" led to
broken windows in city regions hundreds of metres away. The
emergency operations and the actual alarm history include several
details worth a further study both with respect to information
handling and emergency planning. We will here concentrate on
obvious information needs.
The accident plant produced vegetable oil by an extraction process
utilizing a light petrol type, which was retrieved afterwards by
destillation. That evening the plant personnel had some troubles in
keeping the process temperature on level and more heat was therefore
supplied to the toaster. The smell of petrol increased, and after some
time forced the staff to leave the extraction plant. The first alarm
signal told the public alarm centre that "airplane fuel was spilled on
the road in front of this firm". The alarm was sent by a public bus
driver at the place.
With this plant no local fire brigade took over momentarily, and
according to the report in "Brandværn", information from local experts
did not have much influence on emergency operations. The fire
commander had to work towards several goals:
avoid ignition
stop further evaporation
consider warning and perhaps prepare for evacuation of close
residental areas.
Therefore, he should evaluate the zones with high risk of explosion
and predict further spread of petrol gas. He should find some means
to stop evaporation by removing the heat or the petrol, or possibly to
keep the vapour inside a controlled volume.
After some discussions with the engineer in the power control
section, the fire commander decided that the power lines to the
extraction plant which were presently unloaded should be turned off.
Fulfilling this order led to a violent explosion blewing up the entire
extraction plant. Considering the massive material damage at the site,
and the damaged windows far away, it is surprising that no one was
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killed, but several persons suffered first order burns in face and
hands.
Immediately following the explosion, 40,000 kg of light petrol was
on fire and the fire was developing on different places at the plant.
There was a general fear of coming explosions. The violent events
started alarms to come from anywhere in the city, and rather big
forces with fire engines and ambulances were directed to Dansk
Sojakagefabrik.
The first fire commander on this event had his face burnt during
the explosion and was sent to hospital, after he had acquired
mobilization of a command post, and briefing of the chief fire officer.
The chief fire officer arrived when the fire commander was under way
to the hospital, he therefore started making his own observations.
Rather soon the command was taken over by a new fire commander,
and the chief fire officer could concentrate more on external
communication and news media.
Conditions after the explosion involve:
darkness
ruin piles
large water consumption for extinction
search for injured people supposed to be missing
silo fires with soy beans.
Extra water supply was arranged from a special boat belonging to
the harbour administration, and flood lights were established by fire
service specialists.
According to this source, no dedicated strategies were used, specific
to the extraction plant, and formulated in advance in an emergency
plan context. But the following general strategies were followed:
arriving units park at a reasonable distance from the potential
centre of explosion
remove ignition sources from risk zone
establish defensive cooling on selected objects.
Under such circumstances the fire commander should  consider
the threat from petrol vapours, when residents could be affected, and
the evacuation need should be evaluated. Could the sewer system
accept petrol and combustion products and material from damaged
containers and stores?
The following question should be asked a group of experts when
one was available:
which strategy is a wise one to follow, to control an extraction plant
which is turned  on which utilizes light quality petrol and which is
supposedly starting an explosion rather soon?
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The answer is very urgent to the person in charge, but he does not
have the knowledge and the conditions to choose the most reasonable
answer. Had the command post and the chief fire officer been
mobilized at that time, they might assist the fire commander together
with the necessary company experts.
The accident demonstrates that some sort of very fast risk analysis
could be of obvious value to the fire commander. The evaluations
consider technical matters and a few data are essential for the expert
system: specific data about control units, breaker construction, etc.,
or general data on the degree of automation, in addition to a few plant
characteristics. It is not at all clear which format should be preferred:
universal risk tables, universal procedures, or more specific ones.
Some data from the outside world could serve the fire commander
and the police:
where and when do ambulances arrive?
which hospitals have capacity for burns, for other casualties, etc.?
road status and traffic data to be used for ambulance routes and
for restrictions on common traffic.
locations available as evacuation addresses: schools, theatres,
restaurants, stores.
Case 6, Aalborg
An industrial area of Aalborg was the scene of a leakage from
underground petrol lines to the public sewer system. The alarm came
in the early afternoon one day when personnel at a sewer pump
station experienced a rather strong smell of petrol from the input flow
to the station.
The first reactions of the fire service were based on experience from
other cases with petrol smell in that area: these had originated in the
environment of a gas production plant. Gas for household use in the
region is produced from a highly volatile type of petrol with a low
content of lead additives. This time, petrol was at first detected in any
well which was tested. Then a measurement programme was
conducted to fix the necessary size of a safety zone around the pump
station. This safety zone involved 40 to 50 wells.
All wells in this explosion zone were covered with sand and plastic
sheets, and the sewer system was ventilated as well as the pump
station. The flow of petrol to the zone did not stop, and both the gas
production plant and several industries were suspected sources.
Inspection of the gas plant showed that all valves were positioned
correctly, and other potential sources came out negative as well.
Now, samples had been taken at the pump station and sent for
laboratory analysis, and after some hours results arrived. These
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analyses showed that the petrol found in the sewer system had
characteristics common with the gas production type of petrol. A more
intense search was made on the gas production plant, and the leak
was eventually localized to an underground pipe line running 2 km
from the pier to the gas production plant. This pipe line was running
in parallel with  the main line of the public sewer system on some part
of the 2 km distance.
A batch of petrol had been delivered one week earlier, but also
internal transfers of petrol supplied the leakage, as there were no
shut-off valve or non-return valve.
The safety zone and the corresponding restrictions were maintained
for 24 hours.
The chief fire officer concluded that fire brigades ought to know the
layout of sewer systems and procedures for accident cases, involving:
isolation of grid sections
alternative means of drain
possible reservoirs for the gathering of releases
admittance and inspection
contact to authorities and experts.
Case 7, Fredensborg
On a Sunday morning during the winter, the fire service was called to
a chemical company "Sadofoss", where adhesives are produced.
The plant director and the production leader explained to the fire
commander that lots of white milky smoke came from one
department, and that the smoke had a strong smell. They
hypothesized that the smoke could originate from self-ignition in one
out of three 1200 l containers with additives for the production of
sealing compounds.
Two firemen with full protection kit inspected the department and
found one container smoking. Access to the container would be
difficult due to machinery and a fork-lift truck parked in front of it.
According to the plant people, the actual content was a mixture that
might generate heat when reacting, and the smoke would contain
hydrochloric acid.
Firemen were instructed by the production leader how to drive a
fork-lift truck and they attempted to transport the container out of the
building. Meanwhile, the police had arrived, and had started to warn
residents in the neighbourhood, instructing people to stay indoors
with closed doors and windows.
Additional firemen had to assist with the transportation job, which
was complicated by the bad sight and a greasy floor surface. Civil
defence forces were alarmed with an air compressor unit for the
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reloading of air cylinders in the breathing equipment. The poison
information centre of a national hospital in Copenhagen was
contacted, and so was the Danish broadcasting system. It was
decided not to use the public sirene warning system, as this would
cover a larger area than that affected by the hydrochlorid acid
emission.
More than one hour after the arrival of the fire service to the plant,
the transportation job succeeded. On a place in front of the building,
the container was turned over, the content washed out, and the
process stopped.
Later considerations by chemists have suggested that the smoke
would include not only hydrochlorid acid, but also unknown amounts
of lead, likely as a chlorid.
Case 8, Copenhagen (B)
One pier in the harbour of Copenhagen was closed by the fire service
due to strong smelling of chemical vapours from a tank on a ship. The
chemical was suspected of being phenol.
The firemen and police experts and specialists from the
environment control unit of Copenhagen tried to identify the chemical
without success. Contact to the receiving firm - a chemical company
outside Copenhagen - revealed that the chemical was a relative to
phenol. According to the company this chemical would be rather safe
due to the strong smell which would warn people before poisonous
concentrations were obtained.
The police and the environment specialist had found that below half
a litre of the chemical had leaked. 12 workmen on the harbour were
sent to hospital for observation due to the risk of getting lung oedema
as a result of the exposure.
The leakage had partly been caused by a failed temperature control,
and the batch had an increased temperature. Therefore, some
discussions followed the event, because the company wanted to have
the container moved to their place immediately. The authorities
decided, however, that the container should stay overnight and cool
down.
This transport case emphasizes the need for clear labelling of
chemicals, using standard names and codes that can be used by the
police, fire brigades, etc. In the actual case, the identification problem
was solved eventually by the receiving company the chemical. In the
common case one may figure that information could be obtained from
a file with Arbejdstilsynet - the Danish occupational health and safety
agency - where a file registers chemicals used by individual
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companies. The "product file" is not accessible for external users, due
to business interests, but access during emergency might be allowed.
In addition to the alternative methods of specific identification, it
may be suggested that expert systems might help the fire commander
do a rough kind of classification using immediate observations, smell,
etc. In this way it could be possible to point out very general
procedures to be effective in most of the cases.
Case 9, Hillerød
After filling his motor-car, the driver forgot to disengage the hose used
for petrol. The filling-stand broke when he left the petrol station.
This event took place at nine o'clock on a Saturday morning with a
lot of people in their houses near the filling station. When the fire
service arrived, it was judged that petrol clouds had spread to 500
metres from the filling station. The fire personnel were able to smell
petrol at a distance of 150 metres from the leak.
The firemen localized a valve on the petrol tank, where the leaking
of petrol could be stopped. A large police force had been mobilized,
and the policemen established the necessary traffic restrictions. At the
same time the police sent out warnings to the people in the district,
using police - car public address systems. People were asked to close
doors and windows, and they were urged not to use open fire.
The fire service also tried to scatter the petrol cloud by using water
jets, when the cloud was moving towards the central parts of the town
of Hillerød. The possible evacuation of a zone up to 500 metres from
the source was considered, but the fire service managed to stop the
outflow of petrol, and the petrol concentration was lowered beneath
the limit of explosion, before the evacuation could be started.
Accounts on this case have been obtained from newspaper articles
and the basis for the fire commander's decisions has not been
described in detail. However, the following information problems can
be suggested to exist in this class of accidents:
if explosimetres, Dräger-tubes, etc., are unavailable, how can one
then derive safety zone parameters from immediate observations,
sight and smell?
universal procedures for "petrol station leaks to living quarters"
should be stored centrally, and be available through an appropriate
information system.
general purpose town analyses for any quarter of any town could be
useful for fire service, police, civil defence, giving distribution of
people, building characteristics, schools, theatres, etc.
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Case 10, Highway
A truck with a trailer both carrying petrol had an accident on a
highway. 36,000 litres out of a total of 38,000 litres of petrol were
spilled on a parking area, and the majority of this amount ended in a
nearby lake.
An explosive fire was experienced in a villa close to the sewer line
between the parking area and the lake. This fire may have been
initiated by evaporated petrol coming from a sewer drain just outside
the cellar of the house.
The operations were conducted by two leaders: the fire commander
controlled operations on the two scenes of accident, and a police
officer controlled traffic and communications with residents,
journalists, broadcasting people, and the electricity company.
This case gives a very clear demonstration of the need for access to
external files. One of the involved fire officers brought a radio from a
parallel job, and this radio operated on the the radio system of the
municipal technical oprganization. Thus it was possible to obtain
information about the sewer systems directly, and at the same time it
would be simple to communicate with pump stations if necessary. The
same radio link was used to acquire a row boat and material for
closing of the drains.
7. THE VIEWS OF EXPERIENCED FIRE OFFICERS
A group of fire officers and civil defence officers has been contacted
and interviewed about the subject "expert systems for emergency
management":
Ole Brøndsted, Civil Defence, Roskilde
Ebbe Bødker, Fire Service, Roskilde
Alex Jacobsen, Civil Defence, Roskilde
Bengt Knudsen, Fire Service, Vestegnen
R. Ringsted, Fire Service, Copenhagen
They were requested to look 10 to 15 years ahead and imagine the
future emergency manager's situation. What types of data, and what
types of decision aids ought to be managed by expert systems? Should
expert systems be brought to the emergency site at all? The
interviewed were required to think of the emergency manager in a
general way, covering both the fire commander and the command post
staff.
The interviews took place on two occasions; the first time with two
specialists, the second time with the other three specialists. No
written material was presented, and the interviews were made as
group discussions using some well-known cases as a general
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reference, especially case 5 above. Several examples were set forth by
the specialists during these two meetings.
The interviewed specialists assume that a future fire commander
and the command post staff may very well use electronic data systems
connected to data centres far away. But concerning the type and
content of such communication, the impression is that updated
status information will be the most important item. The experts do
not imagine more developed types of communication to be of much
use to the fire commander.
Results from the interviews have been grouped under three
headings: update status information, basic expert knowledge, other
types of information.
7.1. Updated Status Information
7.1.1. Route
Which way is recommended leading from station to the scene of the
accident? Such advice shall be an optimal suggestion where both
actual traffic load, road repair, weather, sight, one-way restrictions,
and the most recent traffic accidents are taken into consideration.
7.1.2. Access to the accident site
Today's plans for access to specific sites: theatres, sport grounds,
factories, etc., are frequently out of date. There is a constant need for
updated plans.
7.1.3. Capacity of hospitals
An information centre in one of the hospitals in Copenhagen keeps an
account of actual (hour by hour) capacities for receiving patients on
hospitals in the region. Such information is urgent to the emergency
officers and ambulance drivers.
7.1.4. Plant descriptions
Local geography, plant functions, materials and chemicals are the
typical information one gets from local people, when these are
available. Some of these data should already be contained in the chief
fire officer files, because they are the basis for inspection. Ignition
sources, fire potential, water supply are evaluated regularly, as well as
emergency exits, fire extinguishing systems, also showing that the fire
service may use technical means to draw information from their own
files.
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7.1.5. Sewers
Water and other substances used in the fire fighting will normally end
up in  the sewerage in many cases. The fire commander needs
information on sewer systems, if explosive or polluting substances are
drained into a sewer. He may warn sewer stations on the actual line,
and warning may be given to residents and people on the roads.
Such information does not belong to the fire service, but resides in
another branch of the local authority.
7.2. Basic Expert Knowledge
7.2.1. Chemical expertise
Today, a very comprehensive knowledge system is made available to
the fire commander, with chemical emergency cards, expert advisors,
and information centres with links to foreign systems. Development
trends for chemical knowledge systems should preferably aim at:
means for more expedient identification, as far as this key is a
necessary first step
more selective presentation of relevant information
Fire officers often feel burdened by too much information.
7.2.2. Medical expertise
Fire personnel traditionally follows simple and mostly rather
efficient rules during rescue operations, concerning priorities,
transport of injured persons, and first aid principles. In disaster cases
there will be doctors and nurses mobilized to work on the scene of the
accident and relieve the fire commander.
The chemical emergency cards give specific first aid information for
each chemical. This information is formulated specifically for fire
personnel, ambulance drivers, etc., who can administer first aid in the
absence of experts.
It may constitute a large step forward, if the emergency manager
can one day obtain the set of first aid rules specific for the actual
case, i.e. the optimal procedure, based on the information presented.
Under present conditions, this information is available in fixed sets
and released only when specific keys are presented.
7.2.3. Technical expertise
Case 5 above shows an example where electrical and mechanical
expertise might be of great help: is it advisable under the
circumstances to shut down the extraction plant, for instance by
breaking the electrical power supply? And which procedure is
suggested? In the actual case, an explosion happened at the moment,
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where one power line was broken in order to reduce the amount of
potential ignition sources inside the explosive zone.
The item was not discussed thoroughly during the interviews, but it
seems obvious that a whole class of questions exist with electrical
equipment, control systems, data systems, and mechanical equipment
which could receive some attention, like the chemistry problem has
done for years now.
7.3. Other Types of Information
7.3.1. Relevant strategies
Updated and efficient strategies applying to that particular situation
in which the fire commander finds himself could be suggested.
7.3.2. Rules of the business
Simple reminders could be presented without request, at a suitable
occasion depending on the actual requirements. An example: Do not
leave the scene of a fire until you have inspected the place from all
sides, i.e. horizontally and vertically. Also, some very useful relations
for fire control can be derived from the basic formula
object + oxygen + ignition = fire.
Presented at the right moment, a rather general suggestion of this
class may turn the attention of a fire officer in a more fruitful
direction. However, according to the interviewed fire officers this is not
the kind of help one would like to receive from an expert system.
7.3.3. Risk analysis
For tactical considerations and planning on the scene of the accident
one may need some guidance for risk classification. One often has to
rank risks that are connected, but have a different character making
comparisons difficult, such as:
the risk of fire spread
the risk of residents' exposure to dangerous smoke
the risk of pollution/explosions.
With limited resources, the fire commander must give priority to
one operation at a time.
During the interviews it was not possible  to arrive at a more
specific characterization of this problem, or at a way to solve it with
expert systems.
Implicitly, the risk analyses are part of the scene, whenever specific
emergency plans have been made for the actual object.
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7.3.4. Map of resources
At present a lot of book-keeping has to be done in command centres,
etc., to keep track of resource movements and distributions. On this
basis one is able to inform the fire commander about expected arrival
times of fire engines, ambulances, etc.
It will be possible to include actual traffic data, road restrictions,
and standard times for setting up equipment after arrival at the scene
of the accident, and in this way suggest, for instance, the time when
the next fire engine has arrived, and a fire escape is made operational.
The improvement with respect to the present situation should be
that data from road authorities and the police might be collected
automatically, instead of depending on actual investigations made by
the command staff when resources do not arrive as expected.
7.3.5. Command post, coordinating center
In cases when a command post or coordination centre is established,
these may take over long-range planning and trouble shooting, as
requested by the fire commander. They may also do the book-keeping
job just mentioned.
With an organization like this, the preference of a fire commander
would be an expert system giving immediate and short answers,
whereas the staff at a command post or coordinating centre will be
able to run dialogues with the expert system.
7.3.6. The experts of the plant
When the fire commander gets in touch with local people at the
company having the accident, he will be very receptive to information
and evaluations. If a local fire brigade is organized at the site, the
officer on duty will most probably be used as a knowledge bank by the
fire commander.
Most local experts will be better informed and much more easy to
consult than general experts, because the fire commander does not
have to specify the input explaining the actual situation.
7.4. Conclusion
Today's fire commander typically brings a few specific data sets with
him to the scene of the accident:
a collection of chemical emergency cards
a "catalogue" with key information on selected objects of the area
an inventory with useful addresses and telephone numbers.
These data will be sufficient in very ordinary cases, but
supplementary information may be needed, from public files and from
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private firms and experts. An important class of data includes
updated status information concerning:
people on the roads, in residences
road systems and traffic data
hospitals, doctors, first aid teams
sewers
useful data for evacuation
stocks of selected material and equipment for fast delivery: tools,
food, extinguishing agents, etc.
A resuming statement from the interviews will be that a future fire
commander will be able to communicate with an expert system, but
he does not have the time for stepwise dialogues to direct the expert
system towards the answer he needs. In other
words, the expert system shall offer him a very high degree of
efficiency.
But at the moment fire commanders often have to rely on
information from experts and public files, which they have to gather
with big delays, and where they sometimes may do without such
knowledge, because the accident takes place outside working hours.
The fire commander wants fast answers, short answers, and
operational answers. He will traditionally be better motivated to
communicate with the accidental event: his own observations and the
fire personnels' observations draw his attention from any other data
source. Therefore, expert systems may seem best suited for command
posts and coordination centres.
The best advice from an expert is obtained when he has a rather
specific image of the actual trouble. This places a communication load
on the part of the fire commander, resulting in a high price for the
information he needs.
8. STRUCTURE OF AN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
SYSTEM EXEMPLIFIED BY DANISH CONDITIONS
8.1. Information Sources Available and Their Contents
The purpose of this subsection is to review important and typical
information sources and their contents, relevant for emergency
management support systems, and to relate them to the problem
domains proposed previously. A more detailed description of the main
information sources is given in section 5.
In Table 2 the more important of the available information sources
are listed. Each type has been given an individual number referred to
in the following discussion. In the schemes of figures 12 and 13 the
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type numbers have been added in order to indicate the locations of
the problem domains related to the particular information source.
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TABLE 2.
_______________________________________________________________
Type of
informa-
tion
_______________________________________________________________
Information sources relevant to fire fighting
1.  Fire Law (641  29/12-1976). (Brandloven, 1976)
2.  Municipal regulations
3.  Guidelines for materials and preparedness of the fire fighting service
(1977)
4.  Personnel education (336  21/7-1970)
5.  Textbooks from the national fire fighting school including "dangerous
substances"
6.  Alarm procedure (23/8-1974)
7.  Water supply for fire fighting (28/7-1976)
8.  List of localities of hydrants
9.  Instruction for the fire commander (4/1-1983) (incl. his role in
accidents
with dangerous substances), (Instruks, 1983)
10.  Emergency plans, meeting plans, fire fighting plans, for specific
industries:
information on ignition sources, access to fire, dangerous substances
present,
pressurized vessels, fire-sectioning of buildings, fire extinguishing
means
available, etc.
Capacity of specific resources:
11.  The capacity of hospitals for receiving victims
12.  Fire extinguishing means
13.  Compressed air for respiration apparatus
14.  Locality of pipelines for gas/petrol
15.  Locality of pipelines for sewerage
Information sources related mainly to accidents involving
dangerous substances:
16.  Instruction, guidelines from the administration of the Ministry of
Environment (Farlige stoffer, 1974)
17.  The civil defence administration: rules for assisting services in time of
peace
(Bestemmelser, 1979)
18.  Handbook on "dangerous substances" (applicable to first level effort)
19.  Handbook in card-file form (applicable to second level effort)
20.  Civil defence: chemical advisory and analytical preparedness.
$ (Applicable to third level effort)
21.  UIS-system (Fed. Rep. of Germany, advisory support by telephone or
on the scene
of the accident, including lists of dangerous substances and of
chemical industry
experts, accessible through the Danish civil defence chemical
advisors)
22.  Rules for classification and marking of dangerous substances (the
ADR convention)
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23.  Rules for road transportation of dangerous goods (94  5/3-1974)
Other information sources:
24.  Industrial risk analyses
25.   Analyses of previous accidents
________________________________________________________________
Table 2 reflects the following: From ancient times, the community
has developed an accepted balancing between the specific risk of fire
and the resources found necessary to counteract the risk: The Fire
Services Act (1) and derived regulations (1-9) are elaborated in detail
for personnel, materials, and preventive precautions, in the Fire
Services Act (1) even the role of the anonymous citizen present at the
scene of fire is specified by requiring him to place himself under the
command of the chief fire officer.
It is relevant to mention an important aspect of the Danish
philosophy of fighting accidents: the emphasis given to personnel
education (4, 5) and knowledge. Much information is expected to be
learned by the personnel, enabling them to cope with unexpected,
non-standard situations (Sonnich Thomsen, 1984a).
New chemical substances may lead to new risks of great variety,
and coping with them are the duties (9) of the fire commander
supported by resources already in existence (16, 17). The variety of
risk is considered by a clear-cut three-stage procedure for search of
information: 1) listed information (18, 19) applicable at the scene of
the accident, 2) information supplied by advisors (20, 21) and 3) data
to be consulted if necessary.
For general availability of resources, the cooperation between, and
the assistance provided by, different services are specified by
regulations (16, 17): Municipal fire fighting services, rescue
companies, civil defense and police.
Also for preparedness of a more specific kind, a trend can be
observed: requiring some kind of specific emergency plans (10) for
large enterprises such as oil refineries and chemical process plants.
Further preparedness could aim at the counteraction of a specific
accident situation in a particular industrial plant for which a risk
analysis (RA) has been performed: an obvious suggestion would be
that information (24) provided by the RA should be somehow utilized
for prioritizing the emergency preparedness or, in an actual accident,
for identification of the actual situation and for prediction of courses
of events. It should be remembered, however, that a precondition for
this is that the assumptions made and the models applied in the RA
are still valid in the actual situation. A similar validity problem exists
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if utilizing information (25) from previous accidents for identifying an
actual accidental situation.
The study of the accident cases indicated that for these cases the
following types of information were or could be important:
Table 3
_______________________________________________________________
Type of Case No.
information
_______________________________________________________________
10 1 Fire properties of buildings and structures
10 1,2,4   Overview of storage tanks needing cooling or
screening from fire
10,12 1,4 Possibilities of supplementary water supply
3,6,9   Support for judging the extension of explosive
gas or petrol vapour clouds
14 6 Plans/maps showing locality of gas/petrol
pipelines
18,19 8 Identification of dangerous substances
10,18-21 1,5,7 Fire and toxic properties of manufactured
products under storage and under production
15 1,10 Plans/maps showing locality of sewerage
pipelines
_______________________________________________________________
8.2. Users of Information
In this subsection the more important roles in Danish emergency
management are identified and discussed. The discussion is based on
the Danish accident cases and interviews with professionals as
described in section 6 and 7, respectively.
The key roles in emergency management identified by the Danish
sources are: the fire commander who fights the accident on-site
together  with his firemen. In large accidents a command post may be
established close to the scene of the accident and provided with staff
and equipment for the support of communication. This was done in
two of the cases analyzed (Nos. 4 and 5). In very large accidents, a
coordination center may be established at a predetermined location,
perhaps distant from the scene of the accident, manned with a chief
coordinator and his team.
The distribution of specific functions on the fire commander and
the chief coordinator is described in section 5 and shown in Fig. 11.
The fire commander's tasks are (Haurum, 1983),
- to evaluate the situation on his arrival at the scene of the accident
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- to decide the first attack to be carried out
- to give orders to the group leader of the firemen
- to evaluate whether the number of firemen commanded will be
sufficient
- to report the situation to his station
- to make a more thorough reconnaissance at the scene of the
accident
- to plan and give the order for the subsequent attack
- to monitor the effort and evaluate the results.
It is the fire commander's responsibility
- that the effort is carried through as efficiently as possible paying
regard to the safety of the firemen
- that the forces brought into action  are sufficient for performing the
task without binding unnecessary forces on the scene of the
accident.
For the planning and resource allocation tasks, it should perhaps be
remembered that a dynamic matching of a changing situation with
resources to be required for assistance, considering their delays, etc.,
will probably involve a great deal of "book-keeping".
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that in case of accidents of
"normal size", functions such as closing of streets, traffic regulation,
and evacuation is performed by the police in direct contact with the
fire commander at the scene of the accident.
Scrutinizing this concise description of the fire commander's role on
the background of the Danish accident cases, leaves the following
impression:
The fire commander will often be forced to make quick decisions
based on incomplete information about the actual situation. His direct
interaction with the accident is likely to be considered more important
than his communication with any artificial information system. Any
kind of communication between the  fire commander and an
information system should therefore be evaluated for a balancing of
benefit versus negative effects, which are perhaps difficult to define as
they are likely to be very situation dependent.
From the task description above it is also seen that the fire
commander is the (sole) information link between the actual situation
and the hinterland. The importance of this role is demonstrated by
the Danish case No. 5. Further, it should be noted that the
information on the actual situation is a type of information not
covered by the previous information  domains. However, it is crucial
for the emergency management and for its possible utilization of
expert systems.
A coordinating center will be established in very large accidents.
The meaning of "large" will often be applied to the geographical extent
of the accident leading to large forces in action.
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An important general characteristic  is that the coordinating tasks
are not to be performed under the same degree of persistent time
stress as the tasks on the scene of the accident.
In addition to the functions already mentioned for "normal size"
accidents, the following can be listed:
informing relatives, the press, etc.
coordinating ambulance service, evacuation
providing medical assistance teams
arranging special assistance for the fire commander
A profound analysis of the coordinating task has not been made.
However, it is found that, on the Danish scene, the coverage of
"emergency management" is the totality of functions under the chief
coordinator and the fire commander. In the Danish material the
following can be observed:
One coordination center task is of importance for the present study:
the arranging of special assistance for the fire commander.
The coordination center serves as a communication link for the fire
commander (except for his communication with assisting forces).
Consequently, for the Danish design of the cooperation between a
fire commander and a chief coordinator, the scheme of Fig. 14  can be
applied, using  more general terms and also demonstrating
connections with the three information domains identified.
8.3. Information Form and Retrieval
For front-line personnel functions performed, such as fighting fire,
rescuing humans, etc., the immediate threats involved  make it
necessary for them to have training and knowledge enabling them to
operate with a high degree of autonomy.  This background
information (including for instance  priority rules for the rescue of
persons being under different degrees of threat) is important to have
in mind when discussing means of supporting the front-line
functions.
Furthermore, for such functions it seems fair to conclude that
verbal communication, directly or by radio, is the only possible way.
This conclusion, together with one key role of the fire commander, i.e.,
to provide emergency management with state information from the
scene of the accident site, lead to the following proposal: In order to
secure efficient and unambigious verbal communication between the
expert at the front line and the emergency management center, a
communication intermediary at the emergency center should serve as
a professional front line-oriented intermediary  in both directions of
communication. This is shown in the lower part of Fig. 14.
In the following a few typical information forms are discussed.
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8.3.1. Alpha-numeric text, codes
In Sonnich Thomsen (1984a) the following was found of interest:
When code-marking containers with dangerous substances, the
translation of codes into verbal statements cannot be made quickly
and may introduce errors in stressed situations. Verbal text is
therefore recommended.
If an "action" code is prescribing what to do in case of an accident,
such standard actions might be improper in non-standard situations.
For the Danish card-file system for dangerous substances, it is
estimated that recording about 400 substances would yield a
sufficient degree of preparedness. A higher number would result in an
impractical system.
The interviews of fire officers indicated wishes of more expedient
identification of substances and more selective presentation of
relevant information. The officers often felt burdened by too much
information.
8.3.2. Maps, drawings
It could be suggested to transform some types of information stored in
maps into procedures directly applicable to the acute situation and
thus relieving front-line personnel from this transformation. For
instance, an operator of a computerized city traffic control center
could by radio-link pilot emergency vehicles through city traffic in an
optimal way.
8.3.3. Human expertise
As mentioned in Sonnich Thomsen (1984a) chemical experts should
be specialized in "accident chemistry", and be familiar with the
circumstances of fighting accidents. Preferably, they should be
involved already in the emergency planning phases.
This indicates perhaps that advice from experts needs an
intermediary function: translating the questions into the language of
the expert, providing supplementary information from the questioner,
interpreting the advice to the questioner, and in this way making the
advice operable for immediate application in the field. If the fire
commander is seeking advice, an important intermediary function
would be, in a two-way communication, to verify whether the actual
situation fits to the assumptions and models which are valid in the
expert's information domain.
Intermediary functions are indicated in Fig. 14.
Also Sonnich Thomsen (1984a) recommends, based on experience,
an immediate call to the chemical accident expert, even a very short
call, in order to prevent unexpected effects of a dangerous substance.
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The interviews indicated wishes of more specific, and hence more
optimal first aid procedures for the actual case, than the present
standard first aid procedures.
Also the interviews left the impression that information verbally
provided on site by people from the plant hit by the accident was
considered very useful.
The reason for this might be the very efficient face-to-face
communication, controlled by the front-line personnel, enabling them
to extract the information they need in spite of the plant personnel's
knowledge being mostly about the normal plant state and the plant
personnel not unconditionally wishing to display weaknesses of their
plant.
8.3.4. Data bases
Sonnich Thomsen (1984a) discusses data bases for dangerous
substances and concludes as follows: Presently (1984) there is no
obvious advantage by using data bases for the support of Danish fire
commanders in fighting chemical accidents. Among the arguments for
this conclusion are:
the number of substances is in practice not very high, information
at the scene of the accident on about 400 items would be sufficient.
There are still unsolved problems in cross-searching through the
information stored.
The fire officers interviewed reported Swedish experiences with
advisor systems connected to foreign data bases. These connections
had, however, been cancelled due to disproportion between utilization
and cost.
9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The conclusion of the present feasibility study will be that the recent
development of advanced information technology, together with the
trend towards more cognitively oriented approaches to studies of
decision making, offer promising lines of development of improved
tools for emergency management. Such improvements will be
necessary in order to cope with the increasing potential for
unacceptable consequences of accidents which is the result of
industrial centralization together with the widespread use of
hazardous substances. In addition, a reconsideration of the
information basis of emergency management will be relevant now
because much information of great importance for emergency
management will be generated or collected from activities such as
systematic risk analysis, safety inspections, quality assurance
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programs, etc.  Such activities are, to an rapidly increasing degree,
introduced in response to requirements of safety authorities. This
information will not be accessible for emergency management without
special precautions, except in the form of "experts on call". In the
following section, the conclusions from the above discussions will be
summarized.
• The conceptual framework emerging from the cognitive approach
to the design of decision support systems appears to be useful and
adequate at present for introduction of support of emergency
management. For integrated management information systems and,
in particular, for decision support in the rather well structured task of
supervisory process control, modern information technology is now
being introduced for information storage and retrieval and as tools for
the information processes involved in situation analysis and planning.
For the less structured and stressed situations involved in emergency
management, support of the decision processes appears less feasible
but the potential for supporting the decision processes indirectly by
improved and more coordinated data bases. The information in such
data bases will include technical information about potential risk
sources, empirical data from previous cases, and information on
available resources for emergency control. A systematic analysis of the
problem domain in terms of the part-whole and means-end framework
can be an effective tool for organizing the data base, formulating the
need of the decision makers, and specifying the formats to be used by
the data sources. The literature reviews and personal contacts have
revealed no model of real life distributed decision making, which will
be adequate for the design of support of the decision process. This is
clearly a topic of research.
• Information retrieval by emergency managers should be studied
carefully for different constellations of decision makers and advisors
considering different role allocations and organizations. Extensive
data bases including,for instance, information on toxic substances are
in existence, but appear to be of limited use because information
retrieval is ineffective. Retrieval terms are ambiguous, it requires
expertise to make information operational, preplanned procedural
information is typically too general, etc. Therefore, field studies should
be undertaken of the information needs of emergency managers, the
form and content of information from different sources, and the
transformations necessary to generate operational, procedural
information. This study is necessary in order to evaluate the benefit to
be gained from improved and more integrated data base design, from
the  addition of expert system features, and from improved
communication with expert advisors. A cognitive task analysis will be
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a useful tool for this study, judged from the progress now obtained in
retrieval systems for library use, based on studies of user needs.
• Review of several different existing data bases which are
important for emergency management, covering information such as
road construction work, topography of sewerage systems (for potential
propagation of explosive release), technical information from risk
analysis and inspections, etc. This kind of information is typically
collected and organized by various technical services for their own
use. Evaluation of the organization and administration of such data
bases to judge the possibility of adaptation to the requirements of
emergency management in terms of data formats, retrieval attributes,
and rapid updating, will be necessary.
•  The requirements should be formulated to content and format of
risk analysis, incident reports and inspection logs from potentially
risky industrial installations in order to extract and store information
for easy and effective retrieval during emergency management.  As a
consequence of the major industrial accidents at Flixborough, Seveso,
etc., legal requirements are now established for systematic risk
analysis and preparation of emergency plans for a large number of
industrial installations. Such activities will as intermediate results
generate a large amount of data of potential benefit for emergency
management. It will, however, be necessary to specify the content and
format of reports carefully, to make the data available in an acessible
form.
•  Tools for design of data bases for distributed decision making are
now becoming available from the artificial intelligence research.
System architechtures such as, for instance, the black-board concept
in HEARSAY should be considered for organization of the distributed
data bases and the coordinated information retrieval necessary for
effective emergency management.
10. PLAN FOR FUTURE ACTIVITY
Further work on the topic will require a specific project plan including
several coordinated studies. To be of significant impact, it will have to
include studies in different European countries. The basic approach
would be to accept the present emergency management services with
their established task force organizations and equipment. The
executive decision structure and information systems should,
however, be reconsidered and redesigned from the point of view of the
integrated systems approach suggested by Sutherland (1983) and
Rasmussen (1985). This implies that the system should support
strategies for situation analysis and planning which match the needs
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of the actual task, but also that decision makers will have to adapt to
more efficient strategies, given the change in information basis. This
prototypical design will only be possible, if several lines of research
are followed in an integrated way:
•Detailed studies of selected accident scenarios will be necessary as
a basis for the modelling of distributed decision making and the
possible decision strategies depending on the constellation of decision
makers and advisers.
•A study of the data base structure and the communication system
relating experts with access to data bases containing basic technical
information, "hands-on" emergency controllers with information on
the actual state, but needing procedural information, and different
human and/or computer based intermediaries serving for
transformation of state and technical information into procedural
form. This study will involve theoretical as well as experimental
studies of distributed decision making and of user formulation of their
information requirements in "real life" situations. Techniques for user
studies are now becoming available. Such a study in EEC framework
could be coordinated with a similar joint Nordic study in a nuclear
context, sponsored by the Board of Nordic Ministers.
Finally, a study of suitable computer system architectures,
communication systems, and user interface formats will be a
necessary part of the prototypical systems design. Modern AI tools are
available for design of "intelligent" decision support, and such tools
should be carefully evaluated as a part of the experimental study (this
is also considered in the Nordic project). A program for development of
advanced data bases, based on intensive user studies appears to be
compatible with the present JRC program for development of
intelligent data bases (Bastin et al., 1985).
To be able to reach conclusive results, such a theoretical and
experimental peogram will have to be a substantial effort, in an
interdisciplinary program. (Minimum size is loosely estimated to be in
the range of 5 to 10 professional people over at least five years).
11. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Inspiring discussions on modelling of distributed decision making
with Berndt Brehmer, Upsala, in the context of the Nordic project are
gratefully acknowledged.
77
12. REFERENCES
Bastin, F., Capobianchi, S., Carlesso, S., and Mancini, G. (1985): An Intelligent
Interface for Accessing a Technical Data Base. Proceedings of the 2nd IFAC
Conference on the Analysis, Design, and Evaluation of Man-Machine Systems.
Varesa, Italy, Sept. 1985. To be published.
Brandværn (Danish periodical on fire defense, also contributing accident case
stories).
The cases dealt with in this report were described in the following issues:
Case  1: Brandværn  8/78 pp. 16-19
Case  2:     "     11/78 pp.  4-6
Case  3:     "      5/80 pp. 10-11
Case  4:     "     10/80 pp. 18-20
Case  5:     "      8/80 pp. 16-17
      and      "      2/81 pp. 18-23
Case  6:     "     11/82 pp.  8-11
Case  7:     "      4/83 pp. 30-31
Case 10:     "      4/84 pp.  2-4
Case  8 was reported in the daily newspapers Politiken and Aktuelt of November 10,
1983, and
Case 9 was reported in Aktuelt of September 11, 1983.
Brehmer, B. (1985a): Systems Design and the Psychology of Complex Systems.
Invited Paper, Third Symposium on the Empirical Foundation of Information and
Software Science, Risø, October, 1985.
Brehmer, B. (1985b): Notes on Hierarchical Systems. Personal Communication,
Unpublished Note.
Buchanan, B. G. (1982): New Research on Expert Systems. In: J. E. Hayes, D.
Michie, and Y. H. Pao, (Eds.): Machine Intelligence, Vol. 10. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh Univ. Press, pp 269-299.
Erman, L. F., Hayes-Roth, V., Lesser, V. and Reddy, D. (1980): The Hearsay-II
Speech Understanding System: Integrating Knowledge to Reduce Uncertainty.
Computing Surveys. June 1980, pp. 213-252.
Fedra, K. et al. (1985): Advanced Decision-Oriented Software for the Management of
Hazardous Substances: Structure and Design. Laxenburg, Austria: International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
Hayes-Roth, F., Waterman, D., and Lenat, D. (1983): Building Expert Systems.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Lesser, V. and Erman, (1980): Distributed Interpretation: A Model and Experiment.
IEEE. Trans. on Comp. Vol. C-29, No. 12, pp. 1144-1162.
Haurum, G. (1983): Indsatsledelse. København: Statens Brandskole. (In Danish; a
textbook on fire fighting).
Haurum, G. (1985): Information om Farlige Stoffer. Civilforsvaret. No. 6, 1985, p. 10
(In Danish; paper on the identification of Hazarduos substances.)
Lehner, P.E., Probus, M. A., and Donnell, M. E. (1985): Building Expert Systems:
Exploiting the Synergy Between Decision Analysis and Artificial Intelligence.
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics. Vol. SMC-15, No. 4, pp
469-475.
Pejtersen, A. M. (1979): Investigation of Search Strategies Based on an Analysis of
134 User-Librarian Conversations. Third International Research Forum in
Information Science. T. Henriksen, (Ed.), Oslo.
Pejtersen, A. M.  (1980): Design of a Classification Scheme for Fiction Based on an
Analysis of Actual User-Librarian Communications; and Use of the Scheme for
Control of Librarians' Search Strategies. In: Theory and Application of
Information Research, O. Harboe and L. Kajberg (Eds.). London: Mansell, pp.
146-159.
78
Rasmussen, J. (1984). Strategies for state identification and diagnosis, in Advances
in Man-Machine Systems Research. W. B. Rouse, ed., Greenwich, CT: J.A.I.
Press.
Rasmussen, J. (1985): The Role of Hierarchical Knowledge Representation in
Decision Making and Systems Management. IEEE Transaction on Systems, Man,
and Cybernetics, Vol. SMC-15, No. 2 pp. 234-243.
Rasmussen, J. (1985): A Framework for Cognitive Task Analysis. Risø-M-2519. Also
in: Hollnagel, E., Mancini, G. and Woods, D. (Eds.): Intelligent Decision Support
Systems in Process Environment. Berlin: Springer Verlag. In Press.
Rasmussen, J., and A. Jensen. (1974). Mental procedures in real life tasks: A case
study of electronic trouble shooting. Ergonomics. 17, (3), 293-307.
Rasmussen, J. and Pedersen O. M. (1984): Human Factors in Probabilistic Risk
Analysis and in Risk Management. In: Operational Safety of Nuclear Power
Plants, Vol. 1, I.A.E.A., Vienna.
Rasmussen, J., O. M. Pedersen, A. Mancini, A. Carnino, M. Griffon, and P.
Gagnolet. (1981). Classification System for Reporting Events Involving Human
Malfunction. Roskilde, Denmark: Risø National Laboratory, Report No. M-2240.
Sage, A. P. (1981): Behavioral and Organizational Considerations in the Design of
Information Systems and Processes for Planning and Decision Support. IEEE
Trans. Syst. Man. Cybern. Vol. SMC-11, No.9 640-678.
Sonnich Thomsen, E. (1984a): Private communication.
Sonnich Thomsen, E. (1984b): A Protocol for Coping with Ecoaccidents. In: Cairns,
J. (Ed.): Eco accidents. New York: Plenum Press. In Press.
Stebb, R., Cammarata, S., Hayes-Roth, F. A., Thorndyke P.W. and Wesson R. B.
(1981): Distributed Intelligence for Air Fleet Control. R-2728-ARPA Rand, Santa
Monica.
Sutherland, J. W. (1983): Normative Predicates of Next Generation Management
Support Systems. IEEE Trans. Syst. Man. Cybern. Vol. SMC-13, No.3, 279-297.
Thorndyke, P. W. (1982): A Rule-Based Approach to Cognitive Modelling of Real-
Time Decision Making. ORNL/TM-8614.
13. DANISH LAWS AND REGULATIONS
Brandloven. Lovbekendtgørelse nr. 641 af 29 december 1976. (The Danish main law
on fire fighting, fire prevention, etc.).
Instruks for Brand Inspektører i Kommuner med Brand- eller
Beredskabskommission. 4 januar 1983. (Instruction for chief fire officer, fire
commander).
Farlige Stoffer. Instruks om Beredskab, etc.  Miljøstyrelsens Vejledning nr. 8/74. (A
three level general preparedness instruction for accidents involving dangerous
substances).
Bestemmelser for CF-korpsets fredsmæssige assistanceydelser, 1979. (Rules for the
civil defense services in time of peace).
